Embedded in social cleavages: An explanation of the variation in timing of women's suffrage

Trineke Palm
VU University Amsterdam
t.p.palm@vu.nl

Abstract:

Under which conditions did introduction of women's suffrage occur before World War I (early), and when only after World War II (late)? This paper analyzes necessary and sufficient conditions for several cleavages to explain both early and late introduction of women's suffrage in 14 Western European countries: the religious, ethnic-linguistic, class and sectoral cleavage. This way the study makes a threefold contribution. First, it tests Stein Rokkan's cleavage theory, which focuses on existing cleavages in society to explain variation in democratization. Second, this study adds a structural dimension to agency-based studies on the role of the women's movement, which helps to explain why some women's movement had a much earlier success than others. Finally, this paper advances the democratization literature that takes the timing of the introduction of manhood suffrage as a proxy for the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. This proxy is problematic as an early introduction of manhood suffrage does not necessarily mean an early introduction of women's suffrage. Based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the paper shows that the absence of an ethnic-linguistic cleavage is a necessary condition for an early introduction of women's suffrage. Moreover, the fuzzy-set analysis highlights that 1) the absence of a religious cleavage combined with a class cleavage OR 2) a sectoral cleavage combined with the absence of a class cleavage is sufficient for an early introduction of women's suffrage. Concerning a late introduction of women's suffrage it is 1) the combination of a class cleavage with a religious cleavage OR 2) the presence of an ethnic-linguistic cleavage that prove to be sufficient. Since all 14 countries have high membership in one of these pathways, fsQCA confirms the strong explanatory power of cleavage theory.

Key words: democratization, fsQCA, cleavage theory, women's suffrage

I. Introduction

Suffrage is the pivotal right (Susan B. Anthony 1820-1906)

Under which conditions did the introduction of women's suffrage occur before the First World War (early) and when only after the Second World War (late)? For some decades now scholars are interested in the process of democratization, and more specifically in the fight for universal suffrage. Still, to the best of my knowledge there is no comparative study explaining the variation in the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. In studies of democratization the focus is on either the extension of suffrage to (white) working class men or on recent transitions to democracy (Caraway 2004: 443). As Paxton (2001) shows, as soon as the bar is raised to include women's enfranchisement well-known and often quoted theories of democratization substantively change. For example, Huntington's (1991) well-known three waves of democratization disappear. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, the introduction of manhood suffrage is not a good proxy for the introduction of women's suffrage. For example, France, Belgium and Switzerland were early in their almost universal manhood suffrage, but late in terms of the extension of suffrage to women, respectively in 1945, 1948 and 1971. In contrast, Austria and Sweden were late with the introduction of manhood suffrage, although they extended the suffrage to women just after the first World War. This reveals that the variation in timing of the introduction of women's suffrage is not the same as for men; an early introduction of manhood suffrage does not imply an early introduction of universal suffrage (Ersson 1995: 171). Furthermore, although the World Wars in most cases provided a momentum for extending the suffrage to women, Table 1 indicates that this cannot explain why some countries extended the suffrage to women after the First World War, and other countries only after the Second World War.

This paper aims to give a more systematic, structuralist account of the conditions underlying the timing of women's suffrage and by making a threefold contribution. First, in response to Spoormans' (1988: 80) suggestion that the "women's issue" is embedded in other social and political cleavages, this study tests Rokkan's theory of democratization that focuses on existing cleavages in society. Democratization is defined as the "dismantling of internal boundaries, a removal of barriers and thresholds prohibiting entry in the political system, as opposed to exit in the sense of exclusion, emigration, or secession" (Flora et al. 1999: 9). This definition emphasizes democratization as a process of inclusion, i.e. as increasing the entry to and participation in the political system. In contrast to definitions of democracy focusing on accountability of the government which may allow for a restriction of the operationalization to universal manhood suffrage, the definition used here points at the importance of women's suffrage independently from manhood suffrage.

Second, this study adds a structural dimension to agency-based studies on the role of the women's movement. While a host of case studies on the women's movement exist (e.g. Banaszak 1996; Dubois 1998; Jo and Buhle 1978; Law 2000; Scott and Scott 1982), these studies neglect the context (i.e. the urban, class, ethnic-linguistic and religious structure) that provide women's movements with opportunities and constraints. For example, Banaszak (1996) compares the women's movements in the United States and Switzerland and explains their varying success by looking at the different tactics the movements used. However, as these women's

movements did not emerge and act in a vacuum it is likely that structural social conditions affected the chances of success for the women's movement. Hence, we need a more structuralist account to explain why some women's movement had much earlier success than others. Therefore, taking up the challenge, this study aims, as a second contribution, to fill this lacuna and enhance our understanding of which conditions allowed women to overcome the barrier to electoral participation early and under which conditions the second threshold remained intact for a longer time.

Table 1 Introduction women's suffrage

Before World War I	During or after World War I	During or after World War II	After 1955
Finland 1906	Denmark 1915 (1849)	France 1945 (1793)	Switzerland 1971 (1848)
Norway 1913 (1898)	Austria 1918 (1907)	Italy 1946 (1912)	
	The Netherlands 1919 (1795)[a]	Belgium 1948 (1893)	
	Germany 1928 (1849)		
	Sweden 1919 (1907)		
	Ireland 1922		
	UK 1928 (1918)		

Sources: Paxton (2001) for women's suffrage and Spoormans (1988) for nearly universal manhood suffrage (between brackets).

[a]: Universal manhood suffrage in the Netherlands was rolled back again by Napoleon in 1805 and re-introduced in 1917.

Third, this paper advances the democratization literature that takes, wrongly as I show, the timing of the introduction of manhood suffrage as a proxy for the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. I do so by identifying which conditions matter for an early or late introduction of women's suffrage. While exclusion of the poor and ethnic minorities has been applied with general vigour, the question of female suffrage has given rise to large variations across countries (Therborn 1977: 37). Hence, it calls for an explanation that is able to deal with those variations.

According to Spoormans (1988), cleavages in society drove women apart, which means that in countries with more cleavages women were not a united front in their fight for women's suffrage . This implies that the higher is the number of cleavages, the later the introduction of women's suffrage. Yet, I show that it is not the number of cleavage as such but the combination of certain cleavages that explains the early or late introduction of women's suffrage. To reveal the necessary and/or sufficient (combination of) conditions for an early or late introduction of women's suffrage, this study conducts a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)(Ragin 1987; 2000; 2008) here. In addition to finding necessary and sufficient conditions as such, this method focuses on configurations, allowing to find combinations of conditions, which on their own are not sufficient, i.e. conjunctural causation (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). Moreover, it does not assume that there is one way to Rome; there may be several causal pathways to the same outcome. Another advantage of fsQCA is that this type of analysis is well-suited to study an intermediate number of cases, which is the case for this research.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses Rokkan's cleavage theory and its use for the topic of women's suffrage combined with a special discussion of the key concepts. The third section formulates hypotheses inspired by Rokkan's cleavage theory and other literature. Next, I explain fsQCA and calibrate (i.e. operationalize) the conditions. The fifth section assesses under which conditions a relatively early or relatively late introduction of women's suffrage took place. Finally, the paper concludes by a summary of the four main findings, its generalizability, and suggestions for further research. First, the timing of women's suffrage in all 14 countries can be explained using the four cleavages as identified by Rokkan. Second, the absence of an ethnic-linguistic cleavage proves to be a necessary condition for an early introduction of women's suffrage. Logically following from this is the presence of the ethnic-linguistic cleavage as a sufficient condition for a late introduction of women's suffrage. Third, the combination of the other cleavages form sufficient combinations of conditions as well. On the one hand, it is the absence of a religious cleavage combined with a class cleavage *or* the combination of a sectoral cleavage with the absence of a class cleavage that is sufficient for an early introduction of women's suffrage to occur. On the other hand, it is the combination of a class cleavage with a religious cleavage that forms a sufficient combination of conditions for a late introduction of women's suffrage. Finally, the analysis shows that whether the class cleavage has a negative or positive effect on the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage depends on the presence or absence of a religious cleavage. This sheds new light on the ambiguity in the literature on the relationship between the class cleavage and women's suffrage.

II. Rokkan's cleavage theory

Rokkan's work is concerned with the European nation-states and their democratization. More specifically, Rokkan focuses on the structural features of these nation-states and the developmental paths pursued by them (Flora et al. 1999: 4). So, Rokkan concentrates on comparing structures rather than actors, and focuses on differences between countries rather than on similarities. Another main feature, and contribution to democratization theories, is that Rokkan presents the political development in Europe in the form of configurations rather than as a hierarchy of factors (Flora et al. 1999: 10). In other words, one cannot "isolate a single explanatory variable in isolation from the context" (Rokkan in Flora et al. 1999: 11). So, research that shows no clear relationship between the several conditions and suffrage extension based on correlation matrices and regression analysis (e.g. Errson 1995) is no real falsification of Rokkan's theory, because Rokkan explicitly

emphasizes a holistic and configurational approach; it is the specific combination of certain conditions that has an impact. This study focuses precisely on such configurations.

Derived from particular configurations and region-specific models Rokkan distinguishes four "master variables" – urban structure, agrarian structure, ethnic/linguistic structure and church structure (Flora et al. 1999: 11) –, which he expects to have explanatory power beyond the specific context of Europe. Rokkan employs a retrospective diachronic analysis, asking the question which differences in the earlier processes of state formation and nation-building can account for the success or failure of later democratization (Flora et al. 1999: 15). Concerning the timing and speed of the extension of suffrage, Rokkan (1970: 58) identifies three historical conditions: medieval consolidation, type of representation and status in the international system. However, since the introduction of women's suffrage was in general later than men's enfranchisement and coincided more or less with the development of the party system, it is plausible that there is less influence of the historical conditions, but rather that it is the cleavage structure that had an impact on the timing, i.e. as women needed the support of other prominent actors in society, they depended upon other fundamental conflicts within society (cf Spoormans 1988).

A cleavage is not just a conflict, but a "fundamental opposition within a territorial population which stand out from the multiplicity of conflicts rooted in the social structure" (Flora et al. 1999: 7). Latent differences break out at critical junctures and take on manifest institutional and organizational forms in the process of political system-building. The different combinations of cleavages, which can vary per country, are called cleavage structures (Flora et al. 1999: 7). The four main cleavages result from the outcomes of four revolutions. The national and industrial revolution each resulted in two cleavages. The former brought about the centre-periphery cleavage (territory), which was triggered by ethnic-linguistic divisions, and the religious cleavage, which denotes the church-state relationship. The industrial revolution produced the agricultural (land) vs. industrial conflict, i.e. sectoral cleavage and the class cleavage, i.e. the conflict between owners and workers (Rokkan 1970).

Although mentioning enfranchisement of women a few times, Rokkan focuses on manhood suffrage when discussing democratization, i.e. he does not look for an explanation of the variation in timing concerning women's suffrage (Flora et al. 1999: 252/253). Limiting the focus to manhood suffrage would have been justifiable in case early manhood suffrage would be a good indicator of early enfranchisement of women as well. However, as indicated above (see Table 1), the variation in the timing of women's suffrage is not the same as for men, i.e. an early introduction of male suffrage does not imply an early introduction of universal suffrage (Ersson 1995: 171). So, although the general idea of Rokkan that cleavages in society matter in the process of democratization remains useful, his argument will have to be adjusted to the women's struggle for suffrage. So, this study is not a replication of a Rokkanian analysis, but is inspired by his configurational approach on the role of cleavages in society. In section 4, I formulate hypotheses on how combinations of the religious cleavage, the ethnic-linguistic cleavage the class cleavage, and the sectoral cleavage affect the timing of suffrage extension to women. Yet, let me first explain the two key concepts of this article.

III. Cleavage theory and Women's Suffrage

How do the four cleavages (religious, ethnic-linguistic, class and sectoral) relate to the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage? I will argue that it is the *combination* of those cleavages that is expected to lead to an early

or late introduction of women's suffrage. In other words, the cleavages are expected to be INUS-conditions, meaning an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions (Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 232). Nevertheless, first I will discuss how each cleavage relates to the issue of women's suffrage. Moreover, in fsQCA no causal symmetry is assumed (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009), which means that the explanation of an early or late introduction of women's suffrage may be different. Therefore, after the discussion of the separate conditions I formulate two hypotheses, on respectively early and late introduction of women's suffrage.

Religious cleavage

Rokkan (1971: 117) argues that the Catholic Church was a force that slowed down the process of democratization and mass mobilisation, because in those countries where the Catholic Church was dominant it allied with "the privileged bodies of the ancient regime." Hence, there was no need for the Catholic Church to mobilize voters and extend the suffrage. Rokkan's argument applies to suffrage extension in general, to both men and women. Bertocchi (2010), conversely, provides a more substantive argument concerning the role of the Catholic Church in extending the suffrage to women. According to him it is the "traditional view of women's role" that explains the late introduction of women's suffrage in Catholic countries. Bertocchi (2010: 5) argues that the protestant reformation introduced 'new values regarding the role of women, among which a belief in a woman's free choice of a husband, and in the importance of education for young girls, in order to allow them to read the Gospel'.

Moreover, the Catholic counter reformation responded to the Reformation with a further tightening of its attitudes on the role and position of women. So, the expectation is that a strong presence of the Catholic Church (i.e. a large Catholic population) delays the introduction of women's suffrage, whereas in a dominantly Protestant country (i.e. a large Protestant population) women's right to vote is extended early on. In addition to the Protestant and Catholic countries there are mixed countries which are religiously fragmented (i.e. there is a big religious minority, either Protestant or Catholic). In those countries I expect that there is a relatively early introduction when the Protestants are dominant and a relatively late one when the Catholics are dominant. In sum, the absence of a predominantly Catholic population is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions leading to an early introduction of women's suffrage, while the presence of a predominantly Catholic population is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions explaining the late introduction of women's suffrage.

Ethnic-linguistic cleavage

The ethnic-linguistic structure (i.e. the extent of ethnic-linguistic homogeneity in a country) is introduced by Rokkan to explain whether the political system will become majoritarian or proportional (Flora et al. 1999: 27) rather than the variation in suffrage extension. However, since in general women attained the right to vote later than men, the process of party system development and the struggle for women's suffrage coincide. So, it may be that ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity did not affect the early or late introduction for manhood suffrage, whereas it matters for the variation in the introduction of women's suffrage.

There are two arguments supporting the expectation that ethnic-linguistic heterogeneity has a delaying effect on the extension of the right to women. First, in countries with a large ethnic-linguistic minority the

integration of this minority is the "dominant" problem. The extension of the suffrage to men of these minority groups comes at the cost of a further delay of the introduction of women's suffrage. Second, in countries with a lot of ethnic-linguistic groups (i.e. a country existing of only minorities) women are divided based on their ethnic-linguistic identity, which prevents them from acting together for their right to vote.

In sum, ethnic-linguistic fragmentation (i.e. the presence of either one large minority or a country existing of only minorities) is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions explaining the late introduction of women's suffrage, whereas the absence of ethnic-linguistic fragmentation is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions that explains the early introduction of women's suffrage.

Class cleavage

Although not so much mentioned by Rokkan in relation to the extension of suffrage, one of the main cleavages he identifies is the class cleavage (i.e. the fundamental division between workers and employers). Yet, in relation to women's suffrage this cleavage may be highly relevant. The expansion of manhood suffrage may be intimately linked to the continued exclusion of women, because the suffrage was often extended to working class men at the expense of a prolonged exclusion of women (Caraway 2004: 448). By only focussing on the inclusion of working class men, one overlooks this dimension. On the other hand, Therborn (1977: 39) points at Finland to argue that class conflict helped women to get the right to vote. Taking into account that the existing literature is more ambiguous on the effect of this cleavage on the timing of women's suffrage, I follow Caraway's argument and hypothesize that class conflict is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions leading to a late introduction of women's suffrage and that the absence of class conflict is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions explaining an early introduction of women's suffrage. So, a large number of labour disputes (as indicator of the class cleavage) is a delaying condition for the introduction of women's suffrage, whereas the (relative) absence of labour disputes allows for an early introduction of women's suffrage.

Sectoral cleavage

The sectoral cleavage denotes the conflict between agrarians and industrialists (Rokkan 1981: 58). In countries were this cleavage is present, I expect that the introduction of women's suffrage is delayed, in contrast to countries in which the process of industrialization did not meet a high level of protest. In the latter, women became part of the (industrial) labour force sooner which allowed them, in the absence of class struggle, to organize and to ally with their male colleagues. The population of the labour force working in the agricultural sector nicely captures the sectoral cleavage; a high percentage of the labour force working in the agricultural sector indicates a sectoral cleavage. I hypothesize that a more industrialized country introduces women's suffrage early vis-à-vis a more agricultural society, which I expect to have a later introduction of women's suffrage. In sum, whereas a sectoral cleavage is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions leading to a late introduction of women's suffrage, the absence of a sectoral cleavage is a necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions leading to an early introduction of women's suffrage

Fuzzy-set hypotheses

Based on the existing literature there is no expectation of necessary conditions or single sufficient conditions, instead, I hypothesize that the absence of the combination of these four cleavages together brings about an early

introduction of women's suffrage. In other words, the cleavages are expected to be INUS-conditions, meaning an insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions. Specifically, I hypothesize:

> *Early introduction hypothesis:* the combination of the absence of a Catholic population AND the absence of ethnic-linguistic fragmentation AND the absence of a large agricultural sector AND the absence of labour disputes will lead to an early introduction of women's suffrage.

In Boolean logic, logical AND (*) refers to the combination of sets and logical OR (+) to the intersection of sets. Furthermore, capitals indicate the presence of a condition and lowercase its absence. Hence, in Boolean notation the hypothesis reads:

> homogenous Catholic * high ethnicfrag * large agricultural sector * large number of labour disputes → Early introduction of women's suffrage

Recall that QCA does not assume causal symmetry. Yet, causal symmetry is very well possible. In general I expect that the presence of a cleavage will lead, in combination with other cleavages, to a late introduction , while the absence of a cleavage, in combination with the absence of other cleavages, will lead to an early introduction of women's suffrage, i.e. causal symmetry. Nevertheless, I formulate a separate hypothesis for the absence of the outcome (i.e. a late introduction of women's suffrage), because the presence of both a class cleavage and sectoral cleavage is theoretically unlikely. Since both the sectoral cleavage and the class cleavage relate to the process of industrialization but point in opposite direction, I expect that it is either the class cleavage (in case of industrialization) or the sectoral cleavage (in case of a rural society) to be sufficient, in combination with the religious and ethnic-linguistic cleavage, for a late introduction of women's suffrage:

> *Late introduction hypothesis:* the combination of the presence of ethnic-linguistic fragmentation AND the presence of a Catholic population AND the presence of labour disputes OR the presence of a large agricultural sector will lead to a late introduction of women's suffrage.

In Boolean notation:

> HIGH ETHNICFRAG * HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC * (HIGH NUMBER OF LABOURDISPUTES + LARGE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR)
> → Late introduction of women's suffrage

IV. Method

Rokkan stresses the importance of taking the context into account instead of isolating one or a few variables (Flora et al. 1999: 10). Focussing on configurations rather than single factors, fsQCA is a configurational comparative method based on the work of Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008). What distinguishes it from a quantitative large-N analysis is that instead of focusing on "independent variables" it is the configuration of conditions that matters. For example, set relations (i.e. the combination of several conditions) can be strong, despite relatively weak separate correlations (Ragin 2008: 41), as Ersson's (1995) analysis shows.

Moreover, in contrast to large-N analyses in fsQCA, no uniformity of causal effects is assumed (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009), which means that combined with another condition there may be an adverse effect. Additionally, fsQCA is well-suited to study an intermediate number of cases. Concerning the case-selection, both homogeneity and heterogeneity are important. There must be some homogeneity among cases to be sufficiently comparable on background characteristics (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009: 20). On the other hand, a maximum of heterogeneity regarding the outcome is necessary, which means selecting cases both in which the outcome did not occur and in which the outcome did occur. Based on these two criteria I limit the cases to Western Europe, because there is similarity of background factors combined with variation of the outcome (i.e. early or late introduction of women's suffrage). Hence, the following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.[1]

Operationalization
In fsQCA raw data are transformed or calibrated in fuzzy-set membership scores (see Appendix I for the raw data and corresponding fuzzy-set membership scores). Whereas 0 indicates nonmembership (i.e. fully out of a set), 1 means full membership (i.e. fully in of a set). For each condition a threshold is set for being fully in and fully out the set, based on substantive knowledge. Moreover, a crossover point (0.5) has to be set as to distinguish between cases which are more out and cases which are more in the set. I will use a five-value fuzzy set (cf. Ragin 2009: 91), except for the condition of ethnic-linguistic fragmentation, because in the latter the data are more dispersed. Hence for ethnic-linguistic fragmentation a seven-value fuzzy set is used (Ibid.) For an overview of the coding scheme of fuzzy-set scores per condition see Table 2.

To calibrate the outcome, i.e. the year of introduction of women's suffrage (*early introwomensuf*), into fuzzy-set scores I place the qualitative breakpoints 0 and 1 at 1914 and 1955. Countries that introduced women's suffrage already before the start of the First World War can be called early, whereas countries that introduced women's suffrage only after the Second World War are classified as late. The crossover point is set at 1940, because in countries that had not introduced the right to vote for women by 1940 the critical juncture of the First World War was missed, which makes them late rather than early introducers.[2]

---

[1] Iceland and Luxembourg are excluded because of their limited size. Greece, Portugal and Spain are excluded because they experienced a major setback in terms of democratization which survived long after the Second World War ended.
[2] A more conservative coding of the countries, i.e. placing the crossover point after the First World War instead of just before the Second World War does not add to the explanatory power of the analysis.

Table 2a Coding scheme fuzzy-set conditions: Homogenous Catholic

Four-value Fuzzy set-score	Homogenous Catholic
0	<50% Catholic Population and Religous fragmentation <.4
0.25	<50% Catholic Population and Religious fragmentation >.4
.50	50% Catholic Population and Religous fragmentation .4
0.75	>50% Catholic Population and Religious fragmentation >.4
1	>50% Catholic Population and Religious fragmentation <.4

Table 2b Coding scheme fuzzy-set conditions: Labour disputes, Urbanization and Introduction Women's suffrage

Five-value Fuzzy set-score	Large number of Labour disputes	Large Agricultural sector	Early Introwomensuf.
0	<25,000	<30	>1955
0.25	25,000-30,000	30-40	1940-1955
0.5	30,000	40	1940
0.75	30,000-45,000	40-50	1914-1940
1	>45,000	>50	<1914

Table 2c Coding scheme fuzzy-set conditions: Ethnic fragmentation

Seven-value Fuzzy set-score	High Ethnicfrag
0	<0.05
0.17	0.05-0.1
0.33	0.1-0.2
0.67	0.2
0.83	0.2-0.3
1	0.3-0.4

Next, let me discuss the calibration of the conditions into fuzzy-scores starting with the condition *homogenous Catholic,* the indicator of the religious cleavage. This condition is based on two measures: 1) the percentage of the population belonging to either Catholicism or Protestantism and 2) the religious fragmentation index, which measures the likelihood that two random persons belong to a different religion. Whereas the first is used to distinguish whether a country is above or below the crossover point (i.e. 50% of the population), the second is used to distinguish between countries that are fully in or out the set and countries that are more or less in or out the set. So, homogenous Catholic countries have full membership in the set (1) and homogenous Protestant countries do not have membership in the set (0). Moreover, the qualitative threshold for the religious fragmentation index is placed at 0.4 which means that Catholic countries with a large Protestant minority are coded as "more out than in the set" (.75), whereas Protestant countries with a large Catholic minority are coded as "more out than in the set" (.25).

Second, the ethnic-linguistic cleavage (*high ethnicfrag*) is measured using the ethnic fragmentation index, which estimates the likelihood that two random persons in a society belong to different ethno-linguistic groups in 1920. Using a seven-value fuzzy set, I set the qualitative breakpoints 0 and 1 at 0.4 and 0.05, placing the crossover point at 0.2. Substantive knowledge indicates that the ethnic linguistic division has been stronger in Finland than in France (Lane and Ersson 1999: 65 and Flora et al. 1999: 220). By placing the crossover point at 0.2 Finland is coded as "more in than out the set", whereas France is more "out than in the set." The former is confirmed by Douglas McRae (1997), who argues that the Finnish ethnic-linguistic cleavage is less strong than in Switzerland and Belgium, but still present with a Swedish minority.

The indicators selected to measure the class and sectoral cleavage, respectively *high number of labour disputes* and *large agricultural sector*, both relate to the process of industrialization. Hence, the period of 1890 until 1930 is selected, as it is not so much the timing of industrialization that matters, but the extent to which it did result in cleavages. Third, concerning labour disputes the number of working days lost per 100,000 non-agricultural wage-earners is selected as indicator. This measure controls for the variation in "potential strike population", i.e. the dependent labour force. The median of labour disputes from 1890-1930 for each country is calculated, because this is a more robust measure compared to the mean when there are outliers (in this case: Finland) (McCall 2001: 61). In the cases Belgium, Ireland and Switzerland the number of observations (N) is small.[3] I set the qualitative breakpoints 0 and 1 at respectively 45,000 and 25,000, and place the crossover point at 30,000. Concerning the lower threshold, Bartolini (2000: 94) mentions Switzerland, Denmark and Ireland as countries with low industrial conflict,[4] whereas Norway and Sweden are examples of countries with a high level of industrial conflict.

Finally, as argued above it is expected that in industrialized countries women will become part of the industrial labour force, allowing them to organize and ally with their male colleagues. Therefore, as a proxy of this industrialization process I select the size of the agricultural sector. More precisely, it is measured as the mean of the percentage of the labour force working in the agricultural sector for the period 1890-1930. The

---

[3] Nevertheless, their ranking does not change when the number of disputes or the number participants is taken where these countries have an N which is comparable to the other countries.
[4] Bartolini (2000) also classifies France and the United Kingdom as countries with a low level of industrial conflict. However, this is rather doubtful, both when using Bartolini's figures and when based upon Flora et al. (1987), as these countries have some clear "outliers" indicating at least some class conflict. Hence, I do not follow Bartolini (2000) concerning these countries.

qualitative breakpoints 0 and 1 are set at respectively 30% and 50%, whereas the crossover point is placed at 40%.

V. Results

Recall that the conditions of importance for an early introduction of women's suffrage do not necessarily contribute in opposite form to a late introduction. Hence, I formulated two different hypotheses:

homogenous Catholic * high ethnicfrag * large agricultural sector * high number of labour disputes → Early introduction of women's suffrage

HIGH ETHNICFRAG * HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC * (HIGH NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES + LARGE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR)
→ Late introduction of women's suffrage

The fsQCA analysis takes several steps. First, following the advice of Schneider and Wagemann (2010) to analyze necessary and sufficient conditions separately, I first analyze whether necessary conditions are present. As necessary and sufficient conditions rarely exist in social reality, we better speak of quasi-necessity and quasi-sufficiency. The consistency threshold for the former is set at 0.9 the latter is set at 0.8. Consistency here indicates how much the condition is a subset or superset of the outcome and can thus be considered sufficient or necessary. Next, Boolean algebra is used to find out which particular sets of conditions lead to the (absence of an) introduction of women's suffrage. Having assigned fuzzy membership scores to the conditions and the outcome, fsQCA software allows for a logically minimization of the data (Ragin 2008). In a so called truth table, which lists all logically possible configurations of conditions, a value of 1 represents a fuzzy membership score of 0.5 and above while a value of 0 indicates a fuzzy membership score below 0.5. First, the configurations for which no empirical cases exist are removed. Next, the consistency threshold is set at 0.8, which means that configurations with a consistency lower than 0.8 are coded as having no membership in the outcome. Below first, the results for the early introduction of women's suffrage will be presented, followed by the results for the late introduction of the right to vote for women.

An early introduction of women's suffrage
The absence of ethnic fragmentation proves to be a necessary condition (consistency of .92 and a coverage of .77). Both consistency and coverage say something about the fit of the model. Whereas coverage points at the proportion of fuzzy set membership scores covered by the term, in this case the absence of ethnic fragmentation, consistency assesses the degree to which "the empirical evidence is consistent with the set theoretic relation" (Ragin 2009: 183).

Figure 1 Absence of Ethnic Fragmentation as Necessary Condition

In the test of sufficiency, this necessary condition is not included Schneider & Wagemann (2010). Table 3 presents the truth table, which lists all logically possible configurations of conditions.

The truth table encompasses important information. First, it shows that there is one configuration without an empirical case (i.e. logical remainder), namely the presence of a religious cleavage combined with the absence of both a class cleavage and a sectoral cleavage. As explained above, these have to be removed. Second, two configurations have a consistency below 0,8. Hence, these configurations are coded as having no membership in the outcome. This leaves four configurations which lead to the outcome. Having done this, the complex solution term[5], which is the most conservative solution term (Ragin 2008; ch. 9), shows two routes towards an early introduction of women's suffrage: 1) the absence of a catholic population AND labour disputes OR 2) a large agricultural sector AND the absence of labour disputes. In fuzzy-set notation, the result is presented as follows:

> (homogenous catholic * HIGH NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES)
> + (LARGE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR * high number of labour disputes)
> (coverage: .97; consistency: 91)[6,7]

---

[5] In accordance with the hypotheses I included the following counterfactuals for an early introduction of women's suffrage: catholic (absent), agricultural sector (absent) and labour disputes (absent)

[6] While it is good practice to report the intermediate solution in the text, in which the researcher guides the incorporation of so-called easy counterfactuals so as to include logical remainders, this solution term does not have added value in this case, as there is only one logical remainder. Moreover with only one logical remainder, both the parsimonious solution term, which generates the logical most simple solution, and the complex solution term are identical.

Table 3 Truth Table Early Introduction

	Conditions		Outcome		
Homogenous Catholic	High number of Labour disputes	Large Agricultural sector	Early Introwomensuffrage	Consistency	Cases
0	1	1	1	1	Germany, the Netherlands, UK
0	1	0	1	0.92	Finland, Norway, Sweden
1	0	1	1	0.90	Austria, Ireland
0	0	1	1	0.80	Denmark
1	1	1	0	0.67	Italy
0	0	0	0	0.50	Switzerland
1	1	0	0	0.44	Belgium, France
1	0	0	-	-	-

Note: - means that there is no empirical case with this configuration.

In other words, this result covers 97 per cent of the fuzzy set membership scores and 91 per cent suffices to bring about an early women's suffrage. The first path has a unique coverage of 59 per cent, the second path of 34 per cent. Whereas Norway, Finland, Sweden, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands have high membership in the first path, Austria, Denmark and Ireland are explained by the second path.

To sum up, the analysis reveals that it is the combination of the absence of religious cleavage and the presence of a class cleavage or the combination of a sectoral cleavage and the absence of a class cleavage that results in an early introduction of women's suffrage. As all empirical cases have high membership in one of the two paths, the explanatory power of this analysis is extremely high. Furthermore, the necessity of the absence of ethnic fragmentation for an early introduction of women's suffrage to occur is "stronger" than expected. Moreover, taking into account that the membership scores in the outcome are highly skewed, i.e. most cases have an early introduction of women's suffrage, this finding is even more remarkable. Additionally, in contrast to what was hypothesized, the analysis shows that the class cleavage and sectoral cleavage, in combination with the absence of another cleavage (respectively the religious and class cleavage), do not necessarily have a negative effect on the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. First of all, although the presence of a sectoral cleavage combined with the absence of a class cleavage was theoretically expected, the *presence* of a sectoral cleavage as necessary element of a sufficient combination of conditions to an early introduction of

---

[7] Increasing the consistency threshold to 0.9, the intermediate solution reads: (LARGE NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES * homogenous catholic) + (HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC *large number of labour disputes) (coverage: .88; consistency:.88)

women's suffrage is opposite to what was hypothesized. So, rather than preventing women to ally with their male counterparts the sectoral cleavage seems to have provided women with opportunities to have an early introduction of women's suffrage. It may be that women working together with their male counterparts working in the agricultural sector were seen as equal and did find each other in the common fight against the industrialists. Furthermore, the *presence* of the class cleavage when combined with the absence of a religious cleavage as contributing to an early introduction of women's suffrage confirms Therborn's argument that the class cleavage is not necessarily at the expense of the timing of women's suffrage.

A late introduction of women's suffrage
No conditions proved to be necessary for the late introduction of women's suffrage, i.e. no condition passed the consistency threshold of .90. Moving on to the analysis of sufficiency, table 4 shows the truth table, listing all possible configurations of conditions leading to a late introduction of women's suffrage.

Next, the configurations without cases are removed and based on the 0.8 consistency threshold configurations are coded as having membership or not in the outcome, i.e. a late introduction of women's suffrage. Having done this, the intermediate solution[8] shows two paths towards a late introduction of women's suffrage: 1) ethnic fragmentation OR 2) labour disputes AND a catholic population. In fuzzy-set notation, the solution term is:

HIGH ETHNICFRAG

+

(LARGE NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES * HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC)
(coverage: .85; consistency: .87)[9]

In other words, this result covers 80 per cent of the fuzzy set membership scores and 87 per cent suffices to bring about late women's suffrage. The unique coverage of both paths is respectively 25 per cent and 28 per cent. Whereas Switzerland has high membership in the first path, France and Italy have high membership in the latter path. Belgium fits well with both pathways, meaning that this country has both an ethnic-linguistic cleavage and a class and religious cleavage. The solution term shows that the ethnic-linguistic cleavage is sufficient for a late introduction to occur. This may not be surprising as its absence is necessary for an early introduction of women's suffrage. Moreover, the second path is interesting as well, as it points out that the religious cleavage combined with a class cleavage is sufficient for a late introduction of women's suffrage. Recall that the combination of a class cleavage with the absence of the religious cleavage is sufficient for an early introduction. On the one hand, this confirms the contradictory findings in existing research. On the other hand, fsQCA shows that it is the religious cleavage that then makes the difference.

---

[8] In accordance with the hypotheses I included the following counterfactuals for an early introduction of women's suffrage: homogenous catholic (present), large ethnicfrag (present), large agricultural sector (present) and high number of labour disputes (present)

[9] The complex solution reports: (LARGE ETNICFRAG*homogenous catholic*high number of labour disputes*large agricultural sector) + (HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC* LARGE NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES*LARGE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR) (coverage: .75; consistency: 1.0). The parsimonious solution reports: HIGH ETHNICFRAG + (HOMOGENOUS CATHOLIC* HIGH NUMBER OF LABOUR DISPUTES) (coverage: 0.85; consistency: 0.87).

Table 4 Truth Table Late Introduction

	Conditions			Outcome		
Homogenous Catholic	High Ethnicfrag	Large number of Labour disputes	Large Agricultural sector	~Early Intro womensuffrage	Consistency	Cases
1	0	1	0	1	1	France
0	1	0	0	1	1	Switzerland
1	0	1	1	1	1	Italy
1	1	1	0	1	.83	Belgium
1	0	0	1	0	.58	Austria, Ireland,
0	0	0	1	0	.50	Denmark
0	0	1	0	0	.33	Finland, Norway, Sweden
0	0	1	1	0	.21	UK, the Netherlands, Germany
1	1	1	1	-	-	
0	0	0	0	-	-	-
0	1	0	1	-	-	-
0	1	1	0	-	-	-
0	1	1	1	-	-	-
1	0	0	0	-	-	-
1	1	0	0	-	-	-
1	1	0	1	-	-	-

Note: - means that there is no empirical case with this configuration.

VI. Conclusion

While the role of the women's movement has been studied quite extensively, this paper shows the importance of cleavages for explaining the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. First, while the hypotheses specifying the particular combination of conditions were not confirmed, the analysis did confirm that it is the *combination* of cleavages that results in an early or late introduction of women's suffrage. Hence, the study confirms the explanatory power of Rokkan's cleavage theory when using a configurational approach. Second, the explanatory power of the fsQCA analysis is strong, as no empirical case studied in this research remains unexplained (indicated by the high coverage scores). Indeed all 14 countries have high membership in one of the paths. Additionally, the consistency scores amply exceed the 0.8 threshold as well, which indicates that the cases fit very well and that there are no contrasting cases. Third, the absence of ethnic linguistic fragmentation proved to be a necessary condition (though not sufficient as the cases of France and Italy show) for an early introduction of women's suffrage, which is "stronger" than expected, especially when considering that the membership scores in the outcome are highly skewed, i.e. most countries did have an early introduction of women's suffrage. Fourth, the analysis shows that both the class cleavage and the sectoral cleavage not necessarily have a negative effect on the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage. Specifically, the study reveals that it is the presence or absence of the religious cleavage that is of importance to explain whether the class cleavage has a negative effect on the timing of women's suffrage or not. So, using fsQCA this research confirms the contradictory arguments on the impact of the class cleavage in the literature, while it is able to explain those differences as well.

As the study investigates the specific topic of electoral participation of women in Western Europe, its primarily aim is to enhance our understanding of this historical process. Generalizability of the findings is limited, because in later processes of democratization men and women received the right to vote at the same time (Paxton 2000). Nevertheless, the insights this research gives in the importance of cleavages have broader relevance as well. As this study reveals the importance of especially the religious and ethnic-linguistic cleavage in the timing of the introduction of women's suffrage, these conditions may be of relevance as well for explaining the success or failure of other social movements.

References

Banaszak, L.A. (1996) *Why movements succeed or fail. Opportunity, culture and the struggle for woman suffrage*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bartolini, S. (2000) *The political mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980. The class cleavage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berg-Schlosser, D., G. De Meur, B. Rihoux, and C. Ragin (2009) Qualitative Comparative Analysis as an approach. In: B. Rihoux and C.C. Ragin (eds.) *Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. London: SAGE: 1-18.

Berg-Schlosser, D. and G. De Meur (2009) Comparative Research Design. Case and Variable Selection. In: B. Rihoux and C.C. Ragin (eds.) *Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. London: SAGE: 19-32.

Bertocchi, G. (2010) The enfranchisement of women and the welfare state, *European Economic Review,* doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.07.003

Caraway, T.L. (2004) Inclusion and Democratization: Class, Gender, Race and the Extension of Suffrage, *Comparative Politics,* 36(4): 443-460.

Dubois, E.C. (1998) *Woman suffrage and women's rights.* New York: New York University Press.

Douglas McRae, K. (1997) *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Finland.* Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Ertman, T. (2009) Western European Party Systems and the Religious Cleavage. In: K. Van Kersbergen and P. Manow (eds.) Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 38-55.

Ersson, S. (1995) Revisiting Rokkan: on the determinants of the rise of democracy in Europe, *Historical Social Research,* 20(2): 161-187.

Flora, P. S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin (eds.) (1999) *State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe. The theory of Stein Rokkan.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Flora, P., F. Kraus and W. Pfenning (1987) *State, Economy and Society in Western Europe. 1815-1975. A Data handbook in two volumes. Volume 2: the growth of industrial societies and capitalist economies.* London: Macmillan Press.

Huntington, S.P. (1991) *The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century,* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Jo, M. and P. Buhle (1978) *The concise history of woman suffrage.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Kuhnle, S. (1981) The growth of social insurance programs in Scandinavia: outside influences and internal forces. In: P. Flora and A.J. Heidenheimer (eds.) *The development of welfare states in Europea and America.* London: Transaction Books: 125-150.

Lane, J. and S. Ersson (1999) *Politics and Society in Western Europe.* London: SAGE Publications. (4th edition)

Law, C. (2000) *Suffrage and power: the women's movement, 1918-1928.* London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Lovenduski, J. and J. Hills (eds.) (1981) *The politics of the second electorate. Women and political participation.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mahoney, J. and G. Goertz (2006) 'A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research', *Political Analysis,* 14(3): 227-249.

McCall, R.B. (2001) *Fundamental Statistics for Behavioural Sciences.* Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 8th edition

Paxton, P. (2000) 'Women's Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy: problems of Operationalization', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 35(3): 92-111.

Ragin, C.C. (1987) *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2000) *Fuzzy-Set Social Science.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2008) *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Ragin, C.C. (2009) Qualitative Comparative Analysis using Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA). In: B. Rihoux and C.C. Ragin (eds.) *Configurational Comparative Methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques.* London: SAGE: 87-122.

Rokkan, S., A.Campbell, P. Torsvik and H. Valen (1970) *Citizens, elections, parties : approaches to the comparative study of the processes of development.* Oslo : Universitetsforlaget.

Rokkan, S. (1981) Territories, Nations, Parties: Toward a Geo-economics - Geopolitical Model for the Explanation of Variations within Western Europe. In: R.L. Merrit and B.M. Russet (eds.) *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch:* 70-95.

Schneider, C.Q. and C. Wagemann (2010) 'Standards of good practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-sets', *Comparative Sociology,* 9: 397-418.

Scott, A.F., and A.M. Scott (1982) *One half the people: the fight for woman suffrage.* Illinois: University of Illinois.

Spoormans, H. (1988) *Met uitsluiting van voorregt. Het ontstaan van de liberale democratie in Nederland.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SUA Amsterdam.

Therborn, G. (1977) 'The rule of capital and the rise of democracy', *New Left Review,* 3-41.

Appendix I Raw Data and Fuzzy-set Membership score per condition per country

Country	Cathpop	Protpop	Relfrag	Homogenous Catholic FZ
Austria	91.8	2.7	0.16	1
Belgium	98.8	0.2	0.02	1
Denmark	0.2	99.4	0.01	0
Finland	0	98.3	0.03	0
France	97.1	2.2	0.06	1
Germany	36.1	62.5	0.48	0.25
Ireland	89.4	10.5	0.19	1
Italy	99.6	0.1	0.01	1
Netherlands	35.5	61	0.5	0.25
Norway	0.1	99.8	0	0
Sweden	0.1	98.8	0.02	0
Switzerland	41	58.4	0.49	0.25
UK	6.6	90.8	0.17	0

Note: Cathpop is the percentage of the population belonging to Catholicism, *Protpop* is the percentage of the population belonging to Protestantism, *Relfrag* is the likelihood that two random persons belong to a different religion, *Catholic FZ* is the fuzzy-set membership score measuring the religious cleavage
Source: Cathpop, *Protpop* and *Relfrag* (Lane and Ersson 1999); *Catholic FZ*, own calibration

Appendix I continued

Country	Ethnic Frag	Ethnicfrag FZ	Labour Disputes	Labour disputes FZ	Agricultural sector	Agricultural sector FZ	Intro Womensuf	Introwomensuf FZ
Austria	0.08	0.17	27302	0.25	53.9	1	1918	0.75
Belgium	0.55	1	52240	1	22.4	0	1948	0.25
Denmark	0.02	0	14152	0	42.6	0.75	1915	0.75
Finland	0.2	0.33	114707	1	68.6	1	1906	1
France	0.15	0.33	33778	0.75	39.7	0.25	1945	0.25
Germany	0.04	0	35329	0.75	35.1	0.25	1928	0.75
Ireland	0.16	0.33	21093	0	49.5	0.75	1922	0.75
Italy	0.08	0.17	30890	0.75	54.9	1	1946	0.25
Netherlands	0.08	0.17	34607	0.75	25.9	0	1919	0.75
Norway	0.02	0	70342	1	40.4	0.75	1913	1
Sweden	0.02	0	49418	1	46.1	0.75	1919	0.75
Switzerland	0.45	1	8214	0	28.7	0.25	1971	0
UK	0.04	0	53290	1	8.0	0	1928	0.75

Note: Ethnicfrag is the likelihood that two random persons in a society belong to different ethno-linguistic groups, *Labour disputes* is the number of working days lost per 100.000 non-agricultural wage-earners, *Agricultural sector* is the percentage of the albour force working in the agricultural sector, *Intro womensuf* is the year of the introduction of women's suffrage. *Ethnicfrag FZ, Labour disputes FZ, Agricultural sector FZ* and *Intro womensuf FZ* measure the fuzz-set membership score for, respectively, the ethnic-linguistic cleavage, the class cleavage, the sectoral cleavage and the outcome.
Source: Ethnicfrag (Lane and Ersson 1999); *Labour disputes, agricultural sector* (Flora et al.1987); *Intro womensuf* (Paxton 2000)