# How Often and Why Do Military Coups Usher in Civilian Rule?
## Coups, Post-Coup Elections and Autocratic Resilience in the Post-Cold War World

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Recent studies on civil-military relations urge scholar to engage in more systematic analyses of the political outcomes of military coups (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016; Derpanopoulos et al. 2015; Kuehn 2017). The studies argue that post-Cold War military coups do not necessarily pose a threat to democratization. Instead, coup plotters frequently serve as facilitators of democratic rule. In a pioneering study, Marinov and Goemans (2014) find that while prior to 1991 coups frequently led to the establishment of military dictatorship, the vast majority of post-1991 coups are followed by competitive elections. According to their study, aid dependence pressurizes juntas to hold competitive elections within five years after the coup. Thyne and Powell (2016) focus on the effect of military coups on authoritarian regimes and find that coups lead to improvements in the democratic quality of a regime. Both studies mirror findings from a variety of case studies, which highlight a number of so-called "good" of "guardian" coups (Varol 2012; Connors and Hewison 2008; Baudais and Chauzal 2011). A growing public commentary also suggests that coups can be conducive to democratization. Paul Collier is probably the most notable voice in this debate claiming that coups can be a weapon for democracy, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.[1] In line with Marinov and Goemans some analysts see aid dependence as stepping stone for the international community to compel juntas to initiate democratic transitions.[2] Others are more cautious and argue that even though there are prominent examples of "good coups", numerous coups do not usher in meaningful political reform (Bermeo 2016; Derpanopoulos et al. 2015; Tansey 2016).[3]

This paper takes the recent and ongoing debate about coup outcomes as its point of departure. It analyzes the political consequences of all post-Cold War military coups. In the aftermath of a military coup, the ruling junta has three options: First, it allows for multiparty elections between civilian politicians and subsequently hands over power to the elected candidates. In this case the armed forces withdraw from power. Second, the armed forces allow for multiparty elections but intervene in this process in favor of their preferred candidate. In this case the armed forces prolong military rule through a civilian proxy. It is important to keep in mind that multiparty elections do not rule out the possibility of autocratic resilience – a fact not analyzed in detailed by previous quantitative studies on this topic (Tansey 2016). Third, the armed forces do not allow for multiparty elections and establish military dictatorship.

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1 Collier Paul (2009), In Praise of the coup, https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/1997/in-praise-of-the-coup.
2 Alexander Noyes (2015), Did Burundi just have a 'good coup'?,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/14/did-burundi-just-have-a-good-coup/
3 Sebastian Elischer (2015), Taking stock of 'good coups' in Africa,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/18/taking-stock-of-good-coups-in-africa/

The article examines several interrelated research questions: how often do the armed forces withdraw from power in the aftermath of a coup and how often do they prolong their stay in power either through rigged elections or through the establishment of military dictatorship? Finally: which factors influence the decision of the armed forces to go for either of these options? As the armed forces are never a coherent or unitary actor, the study's case-sensitive approach reveals insights into the extent to which juntas withdraw from or remain in power. Although the focus of the paper rests on the behavior of the armed forces in the aftermath of a coup, the findings have implications for the study of democracy. Civilian supremacy is generally acknowledged to be a necessary condition for successful democratization (Kohn 1997; Croissant, Kuehn, and Chambers 2010). In instances where the armed forces prolong their time in power through military dictatorship or rigged elections this condition is not given. The paper demonstrates that there is little reason to be too enthusiastic about the political consequences of post-Cold War coups. Drawing on the logic of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsqca) the paper examines which factors account for why the armed forces withdraw from power in the aftermath of a military coup. The analysis identifies two domestic factors – the participation of citizens in civil society organizations and the degree of social tension – as relevant necessary and sufficient conditions. Aid dependence, by contrast, does not affect the political calculations of ruling juntas.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, drawing on previous studies about civil-military relations, it theorizes how different army factions, civilian elites and external players interact in the aftermath of a military coup. Second, the paper outlines the options at the disposal of the junta. Governing juntas may allow for competitive elections in the aftermath of a coup without participating or intervening in these elections. These are textbook cases of so-called "good coups". Alternatively, juntas may opt to remain in power and establish military dictatorships. As the empirical analyses will show the establishment of military dictatorships are rare phenomena.[4] Both options constitute the polar ends of a continuum ranging from complete withdrawal from to complete remainder in power. Finally, juntas opt for elections and rig these elections in favor of their preferred candidate. The extent to which juntas engage in and succeed at electoral rigging differs across and, sometimes, within cases. While complete withdrawal from and remainder in power constitute the end points of the continuum, the extent and the outcome of rigging are located alongside the continuum. Examining the

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4 These findings are in line with Marinov and Goeman (2014) and Powell and Thyne (2016).

outcomes of post-Cold War coups from across the globe this paper outlines the empirical distribution of all cases alongside the continuum. Around half of all post-1989 military coups resulted in handovers to elected civilian; in a number of these cases, however, the governing junta was confronted by visible dissenting voices from within the military. In the other half of these cases juntas either established military dictatorship or intervened in post-coup elections in favor of their preferred candidate. Third, the paper applies fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsqca) to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the military's withdrawal from power.

**Military Rule and Its Discontents**

In any polity the armed forces constitute the only actor with immediate and unlimited access to the forces of physical subjugation (Kohn 1997). Consequently, in the aftermath of a coup, the most important decisions about the future political trajectory take place within the armed forces (Singh 2014). Ruling juntas never constitute coherent or unitary actors as officers hold diverging views on the future political set-up (Geddes 1999; Singh 2014; Thyne and Powell 2016). Drawing on Perlmutter's seminal distinction between ruler-type and arbitrator-type armies (Perlmutter 1969), I distinguish between three factions: rulers, arbitrators and independents. The ruler faction either is skeptical about the ability of political elites to provide the required leadership or it hopes to benefit materially from military rule. One can expect the ruler faction to be strong in politically unstable or resource-rich countries or in countries with a long tradition of military rule (Perlmutter 1969). The arbitrator faction favors civilian rule. Its members advocate a swift return to civilian rule through competitive elections once the conditions that provoked the military coup are removed (Finer 1988; Bienen 1989; Svolik 2009; Perlmutter 1969). Arbitrators may feel that the armed forces should not be involved in the day-to-day business of governance. Alternatively, their support for civilian rule might grow out of the fact that being in government offers little material incentives. As the armed forces fulfill an important role in any political system they are likely to receive more attention than other entities. Armed forces with a strong arbitrator faction are likely to feature in resource-poor countries and countries with a long tradition of civilian rule. The independent faction consists of officers who are undecided about the future role of the armed forces. The secrecy surrounding the execution of a successful coup (Singh 2014) and the lack of access to the junta's internal deliberations render impossible any in-depth analysis of their decision making. This directs research to conditions, which make prolonged military rule more or less costly. The higher the political costs of prolonged military rule, the likelier it will be for the armed forces to depart from power. The lower the costs of remaining in power, the likelier it will be for the armed forces to prolong military rule. A number of factors and the particular political and social conditions in which post-coup leaders operate increase or decrease the costs of remaining in power.

*Civil society organizations* and *political parties* are opponents of military rule.[5] Both stand to lose from the prospect of a closed political system. In countries where large sections of the population become involved in associational life, civil society is more capable to mobilize citizens against military rule. A strong civil society increases the costs for the junta to remain

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5 This does not mean that they are necessarily advocates of democratic rule. See Kasfir (1998) and Kopecky and Mudde (2003).

in power (for these dynamics see Nepstad 2013). A weak civil society lowers the costs of remaining in power. The same logic applies to political parties. Highly institutionalized parties with links to society at large and offices across the country are more capable of mobilizing their supporters in favor of civilian rule. Weakly institutionalized parties, which represent particularistic interests not only lower the costs of remaining in office but also provide the ruler faction with a reason why a return to civilian rule might be detrimental. Political contest between particularistic parties can easily create an exclusionary political environment in which conflict around elections day may seem inevitable. Often this is the very reason why the military intervened in politics in the first place (Horowitz 2000; Basedau et al. 2007).

H1: A high degree of citizens' involvement in civil society organizations and a high degree of party institutionalization favor the withdrawal of the junta from power.

*International Donors* may sway the junta's decision in favor of the arbitrator faction. This is particularly true of the post-Cold War environment where democratic rule has become a global norm (Marinov and Goemans 2014; Souare 2014; Way 2015). The literatures on autocratic resilience and hybrid regimes show that donors pursue a variety of goals, which may or may not be compatible with democratic principles (Levitsky and Way 2010b; Tansey 2016; Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner 2010). To determine whether aid has a meaningful effect on incumbent juntas several factors need to be taken into consideration. First, the degree of aid dependency of the recipient country. Second, the extent to which aid flows are concentrated in the hands of one donor or a set of donors. Third, whether the donor(s) in question push for democratic reforms at that particular moment in time.[6] A high degree of aid dependency combined with a high concentration of aid among a few donors who are supportive of post-coup elections can pressurize the junta to withdraw from power. A high degree of aid dependency combined with a high concentration among autocracy supporters or a high degree of aid dependency in the hands of both democracy and autocracy supporters is likely to have little effect. A low degree of aid dependency will have no effect on ruling juntas.

H2: A high degree of aid dependency and a high degree of aid concentration in the hands of democracy promoter(s) lead to the withdrawal of the military from power.

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6 For example, French foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa followed different principles in the early 1990s than in later periods.

The armed forces, civil society, political parties and international donors operate within context-specific environments. The previous *duration of military participation in government* affects how the armed forces perceive their role in politics. Countries with a legacy of coups and prolonged military rule produce officers, who regard military rule as the norm. Conversely, countries with a long tradition of civilian rule will produce officers who regard civilian rule as the norm.

H3: A legacy of military rule leads to the prolongation of military rule.

The decision of incumbent juntas will depend on the extent to which their territories are shaped by *ethnic or social tension*. The protection of the integrity of their domestic territories constitutes one of the core missions of the army (Finer 1988). The extent to which the population enjoys safety from potential sources of conflict has direct implications for the ability of the ruler faction to convince the independent faction that the military should stay in office. It is important to note that social tensions do not need to have caused the military coup in question. For a social tension to affect the decision-making inside the junta, the social conflict and the military coup need to share temporal proximity. For example, a military coup might occur because a nation's political elite has become deeply entangled in corruption scandals. Simultaneously the nation suffers from violent ethnic conflict in several provinces. The latter may not be directly relevant for why the coup occurred but it will influence the decision of the junta to remain in power.

H4: A high degree of social tensions leads to the prolongation of military rule.

Scholars have long established that economically poorer countries are more prone to military intervention (Powell and Thyne 2011; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Decalo 1990). To account for post-coup military within the subset of countries which experience coups the inverse logic applies. Countries with high revenues will tempt officers to remain in power while departing from power will not be in their corporate-economic interest (Nordlinger 1977; Leon 2014). Having access to more government revenue also increases the ability to coopt dissidents to military rule (Svolik 2012).

H5: Resource-rich countries see the prolongation of military rule.

Finally, military coups are symptoms of larger and enduring crises. Coups occur because civilian rulers were unable to solve a severe domestic exigency. The nature of the *political regime preceding the coup* can influence the post-coup regime. Coups in formerly authoritarian regimes frequently result in more democratic freedoms (Thyne and Powell 2016; Johnson and Thyne 2016). Where coups end (civilian or military) autocratic rule, the continuation of autocratic rule by the armed forces enjoys little legitimacy and support. Where coups end democratic rule, officers either have lost trust in civilian elites or they will use the failure of their civilian counterparts as a pretext to lobby for the continuation of military rule.

H6: Formerly autocratic regimes experience the withdrawal of the armed forces form power.

The study is both hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generating. Its aim is to see whether aid dependence really accounts for why the military agrees to leave power. Set-theoretic methods with their emphasis on equifinality and their ability to examines events in a case-sensitive manner allow for such an analysis when dealing with a medium-N sample. I also test a variety of alternative causal conditions and whether they interact with aid dependency. Simultaneously, the analysis is hypothesis-generating as I do not examine all possible conditions. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data about the ethnic composition of many countries which experienced a military coup in recent years. Conditions such as the effect of regional cooperation bodies or informal arrangements between civilian political actors and the armed forces also are not taken into consideration.

**Military Coups and Coup Outcomes**

Military coups constitute successful efforts by the armed forces to unseat the sitting executive using unconstitutional means (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). In order to identify all post-1989 coups, I update the dataset by Powell and Thyne (2011) drawing on sources such as Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and area-studies journals. I confine the analysis to coups where the military manages to claim power for at least one month. This excludes ineffective and aborted coups.[7] I further exclude coups which occurred during periods of state failure[8] and coups that occurred in countries which were under partial Western occupation in the run-up to the post-coup elections.[9] Finally, I exclude coups whose outcome is not clear at the time of writing.[10] The paper explicitly refrains from referring to "good coups". Independently of their outcome coups are almost always accompanied by human rights violations and impunity (Derpanopoulos et al. 2015). In much of the literature good coups refer to coups targeting autocratic governments (Varol 2012; Thyne and Powell 2016). This paper is interested in all successful military coups independently of whether they target autocratic or democratic incumbents. Table 1 outlines the universe of cases in chronological and geographical order.

**Table 1: Post-1989 Military Coups (n=29)**

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7 This applies to Sao Tome and Principe in 2003 and Madagascar in 2009.
8 This was the case in Burundi in 1996. Sierra Leone in 1992 and 1997, Haiti in 1991, Afghanistan in 1992 and the Central African Republic in 2013.
9 This applies to Mali in the aftermath of the 2012 coup.
10 This applies to the 2016 Thai coup.

| World Region | Country | Coup Year |
|---|---|---|
| Sub-Saharan Africa | Lesotho | 1991 |
| | Mali | 1991 |
| | Nigeria | 1993 |
| | Gambia | 1994 |
| | Niger | 1996 |
| | Niger | 1999 |
| | Ivory Coast | 1999 |
| | Comoros | 1999 |
| | Guinea-Bissau | 1999 |
| | Guinea-Bissau | 2003 |
| | Central African Republic | 2003 |
| | Mauritania | 2005 |
| | Guinea | 2008 |
| | Mauritania | 2008 |
| | Niger | 2010 |
| | Guinea-Bissau | 2012 |
| | Burkina Faso | 2014 |
| Latin America | Paraguay | 1989 |
| | Honduras | 2009 |
| Middle East and Maghreb | Algeria | 1992 |
| | Egypt | 2011 |
| | Egypt | 2013 |
| Asia | Thailand | 1991 |
| | Cambodia | 1997 |
| | Pakistan | 1999 |
| | Fiji | 2000 |
| | Thailand | 2006 |
| | Bangladesh | 2007 |
| | Fiji | 2006 |

Source: own composition based on dataset by Thyne and Powell (2011) and own research.

In their pioneering study on coup outcomes Marinov and Goemans distinguish between coups ushering in competitive elections and coups resulting in military dictatorships. They code post-coup elections as competitive if three conditions are fulfilled: a) political opposition is allowed, b) multiple parties are allowed and c) the office of the incumbent is contested (Marinov and Goemans 2014, 810). Their definition of electoral competitiveness fails to account for the various ways in which incumbent juntas influence the electoral process (Tansey 2016). The extant and growing literature on hybrid regimes highlights the capacity of autocratic rulers to maintain power even despite the existence of multiparty contest and political contestation (Gandhi and Przeworksi 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Bogaards 2009; Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002, 2013). Drawing on this literature I outline the various options at the disposal of ruling juntas. In line with mainstream conceptual work on civil-military relations (Croissant, Kuehn, and Chambers 2010; Kohn 1997) I conceptualize the various possible outcomes as a continuum. The location of individual cases on this continuum is indicative of the power relations between the ruler and the arbitrator faction. The unit of

analysis covers the period between the occurrence of a successful military coup and the hand-over of power to civilian leaders through elections. Juntas leaving power and allowing for competitive elections without military intervention constitute the positive, juntas establishing permanent military rule the negative pole. Marinov and Goemans (2014) use a five year cut-off point in order to distinguish coups ushering in elections from coups ushering in military rule. The 5-year mark appears arbitrary (see also Johnson and Thyne 2016) and fails to acknowledge why the conduct of elections in some countries might take longer than in others.[11] Instead of imposing an arbitrary timeline, I locate cases on the negative pole if the following conditions are met: First, the period between the coup and the subsequent election is particularly long compared to other post-1989 coups. Appendix I outlines the time period between all coups and the subsequent elections for all cases. Second, during the period between the coup and the subsequent elections the junta consistently postpones a return to civilian rule. Third, junta leaders either die in office, are replaced by other members of the military or are overthrown by a popular uprising.

In the remainder of this section I outline all other possible coup outcomes and demonstrate the empirical distribution of all cases alongside the continuum.

The positive continuum: Military withdrawal from power
- Following a coup, the junta allow for competitive elections. The junta does not intervene in the electoral process and hands over power to the newly elected civilians.[12] The ruler faction is either absent or lacks visibility. I assign a membership score of 1.0 to these cases. They have full membership in the set of cases where the military withdraws from power.
- During the transition period, a visible power struggle emerges between the ruler faction and the arbitrator faction. The confrontation may result in a failed counter-coup or a temporary take-over by the ruler faction. Ultimately the ruler faction fails to derail the transition. Competitive elections take place, the armed forces do not participate or intervene in the electoral process and the armed forces withdraw from

11 Countries which prior to the coup had a multiparty constitution, an electoral commission, a voter register and where elections do not pose logistical challenges are more likely to experience elections sooner than countries in which elections take place for the first time and where a country's infrastructure poses serious challenges for the successful conduct of an election.
12 This includes cases where military rulers participate in elections as civilian candidates and where electoral rigging in favor of that candidate is absent. Empirically this scenario does not feature in the post-Cold War world.

power. I assign a membership score of 0.8 to these cases. Although the military withdraws from power, it houses a visible ruler faction.

- The junta participates in the post-coup elections either directly through the formation of its own party and the nomination of its own presidential candidate or indirectly by visibly throwing its support behind an existing political party and/ or civilian presidential candidate. The elections suffer from administrative shortcomings due to the intervention of the military in the electoral process. The military-backed presidential candidate and his party lose the elections. The ruler faction is not strong enough to rig the elections in their favor. The junta accepts the electoral outcome and departs from power. I assign the membership value of 0.6 to these cases.

The negative continuum: The armed forces remain in power.

- The incumbent junta participates in the elections either directly through the formation of its own party and the nomination of its own presidential candidate or indirectly by visibly supporting an existing political party and/ or civilian presidential candidate. The elections suffer from administrative shortcomings due to the intervention of the military in the electoral process. The military-backed presidential candidate and his party win the elections. The ruler faction is strong enough to rig the elections. I assign the membership score of 0.4 to these cases.
- The incumbent junta participates in the elections either directly through the formation of its own party and the nomination of its own presidential candidate or indirectly by visibly supporting an existing political party and/ or civilian presidential candidate. The junta severely rigs the elections in favor of its preferred candidate. The ruler faction dominates the armed forces. Violence against the civilian candidates and their supporters characterize the election campaign. As the elections are a foregone conclusion the opposition may choose to boycott the elections. I assign the membership score of 0.2 to these cases.
- The junta remains in power without holding elections. The ruler faction dominates the armed forces. I assign the membership score of 0 to these cases.

Figure 1 below summarizes the conceptual and theoretical considerations behind the model. The unit of analysis in this study are post-coup elections and the outcome of interest is the extent to which the armed forces remain or remain in power. It is important to highlight that elections only constitute one aspect of democracy and that therefore, the extent to which this

study examines the effect of coups on democratization is limited to the initial step of the much longer and complicated process of democratization.

**Figure 1**



I examine all post-1989 military coups on an individual case-by-case analysis. In order to assign membership scores I drew on a number of academic sources as well as datasets such as Freedom House, the Varieties of Democracy Dataset and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Appendix II provides an overview of all sources and a short analytical narrative for each case. Table 2 summarizes the empirical distribution of all cases.

**Table 2: Empirical Distribution of Cases (Outcome Condition)**

| | Short verbal description | Fuzzy-set value | Cases | Number of cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| w i t h | Withdrawal from power; no visible attempts to remain in power | 1.0 | Lesotho 1991, Niger 1999, Fiji 2000, Guinea-Bissau 2003, Thailand 2006, Bangladesh 2007, Honduras 2009, Niger 2010, Egypt 2011, Guinea-Bissau 2012 | 10 |
| d r a | Unsuccessful attempt by ruler faction to derail transition prior to elections; competitive elections | .8 | Mali 1991, Guinea-Bissau 1999, Guinea 2008, Burkina Faso 2014 | 4 |
| w a l | Ruler faction unsuccessfully attempts to influence elections in its favor of preferred candidate | .6 | Ivory Coast 1999 | 1 |
| r e m | Elections with administrative shortcomings, which benefit the military | .4 | Thailand 1991, Paraguay 1989, Cambodia 1997, Central African Republic 2003, Mauritania 2005, Fiji 2006 | 6 |
| a i | Severely rigged elections in favor of military-backed candidate | .2 | Algeria 1992, Gambia 1994, Niger 1996, Mauritania 2008, Egypt 2011, Comoros 1999, | 6 |
| n | No elections; military dictatorship | 0 | Nigeria 1993, Pakistan 1999 | 2 |

Source: own compilation, for calibration of outcome condition see Appendix II

In roughly half the cases the armed forces withdrew from power in the aftermath of a military coup. However, only in slightly more than one third of the cases – ten out of 29 – the military withdrew from power without the emergence of a visible ruler faction. In five instances the military withdrew from power but the ruler-faction took a visible stance against civilian rule or intervened in the electoral process. The ruler faction was strong enough to intervene in the elections in favor of the armed forces. These five cases constitute "near misses" as their outcome was not a foregone conclusion. In fourteen out of 29 cases, the armed forces remained in power either by intervening in the post-coup elections in favor of their preferred candidate or by establishing military dictatorship. Therefore, there is little reason to be overly optimistic about the military coups. In twelve cases the armed forces intervened in the electoral process. In only two cases did the armed establish military dictatorship. On the one hand this mirrors Marinov and Goeman's (2014) earlier finding that in the post-Cold War world military dictatorship have become rare. On the other hand, the finding illustrates that the armed forces frequently refer to electoral interventions to remain in power.

**Data and Measurement: Explanatory Conditions**

I measure the conditions which cause the military to leave power (mil_leave) with both qualitative and interval data. Appendix III provides an overview of the various data sources, the calibration methods and the rationale behind the selection of crossover and other threshold points (for details on calibration see Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008). I measure citizen participation in civil society organizations with the help of the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset. VDEM provides data on the *involvement of citizens in civil society organizations* (strong_cso). I examine the participation rates of citizens in civil society organizations three years prior to the coup, during the coup year and one year after the coup. VDEM also provides data for the degree of *party system institutionalization* (party_inst). I examine the degree of party system institutionalization in the period between three years prior to the coup, during the coup year and one year after the coup. I measure the duration of previous military rule *legacy of military rule* (leg_mil_rule) by calculating the percentage of country-years in which countries were governed by the armed forces over the last thirty years or one generation. I calculate the legacy of military rule by using data from the Autocracies in the World Dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). I examine *aid dependence* in three steps. First, I calculate the aid/ GDP ratio for the three country-years prior to the coup to calculate the general degree of aid dependency. In line with the mainstream literature I use OECD and World Bank data. Second, I calculate the extent to which aid is concentrated among donors with the Herfindahl concentration index. Third, drawing on secondary literature I determine whether the main donor(s) pursue democracy promotion.

The extent to which coup countries suffers from *social tensions* (soc_ten) requires an in-depth study of the political environment each of the countries found themselves in in the years leading up the coup. Based on the extensive case-specific literature I identify the violent or other conflicts in question and the extent to which these conflicts threaten national, regional or local security. *Countries with high revenues* (high_gov_rev) will tempt the military to stay in power. I use World Bank data for each country's GDP (in current US$) ten years prior to the coup and during the coup year. Finally, I measure the *authoritarian nature of the previous regime* (pre_ auth) with the help of Freedom House data. I use data for the three years preceding the military coup. Table 3 outlines the calibration of the outcome and the causal conditions.

Niger (1996 and 1999) and Egypt (2011 and 2013) experienced two successive coups within a relatively short period. The outcome of the second coup differs from the first one in that the military reversed its position on to withdraw from power. This applies to Egypt where the military withdrew from power after helping to oust Husni Mubarak in 2011 but remained in power following the coup against Mohammed Mursi in 2013. The Nigerien military overthrew President Mahamane Ousmane in 1996 and severely rigged the 1996 elections in favor of the junta. Slightly more than three years later a counter-coup occurred, which restored civilian rule. I do not regard the first set of coups as individual cases but as an initial episode of a larger conflict between the ruler and the arbitrator faction in which ultimately the ruler faction in Egypt and the arbitrator faction in Niger gained the upper hand. The political trajectories of both countries confirm this.[13]

**Table 3: Calibration of Outcome and Explanatory Conditions**

| Case | mil_leave | strong_cso | party_inst | soc_ten | aid_dep | leg_mil_rul | high_gov_rev | pre_reg_aut |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Les_91 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0.8 |
| Mali_91 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.8 | 0 | 0.8 |
| Gu-Bi_99 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.4 |
| Gu-Bi_03 | 1 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.4 |
| NE_99 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.8 |
| Gui_08 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.8 |
| NE_10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| Gu-Bi_12 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.4 |
| Bu-Fa_14 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.4 |
| Nigeria_93 | 0 | 1 | 0.6 | 1 | 0 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Gam_94 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Iv-Co_99 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.8 |
| CAR_03 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1 | | 0.4 | 0 | 0.4 |
| Maur_08 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Com_99 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.6 |
| Par_1989 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| Hond_2009 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.4 |
| Alg_1992 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Egypt_2013 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 |
| Paki_1999 | 0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Thai_1991 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Thai_2006 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 |
| Bangl_2007 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.4 |
| Cam_1997 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| Fiji_2000 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.4 |
| Fiji_2006 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| Maur_05 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.8 |

Source: Own compilation; Niger 1996 and 1996 and Egypt 2011 and 2013 are collapsed into one case respectively.

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13 Appendix II contains the country-specific literature

**Empirical Analysis: The Armed Forces Leaving Power**

The focus of the article is on conditions, which pressurize the armed forces into leaving power. According to the hypothesized relationship between the outcome condition and the causal conditions I expect to find military withdrawal from power in countries with strong civil societies, institutionalized parties, a high degree of aid dependence, high government revenue and an autocratic pre-coup regime. Simultaneously, I expect social tensions and previous spells of military rule to be absent. I use the following model (model 1) to examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for military withdrawal:

Model 1: mil_leave = f (strong_cso, party_inst, ~soc_ten, aid_dep, ~leg_mil_rule, gov_rev, pre_aut)

Table 4 outlines the results for necessity. There are two central measurements in fsqca, consistency and coverage. Consistency measures the degree to which a relation of necessity between a condition and an outcome is met across all cases. Coverage measures the size of overlap of two sets relative to the size of the larger set. It assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome. In line the recommendations of key methodological textbooks (Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008, 1987) I use the numerical values of .9 for consistency and .7 for coverage as thresholds to identify a necessary condition.

**Table 4: Analysis of Necessary Conditions**

| outcome variable: mil_leave | | |
|---|---|---|
| conditions tested | consistency | coverage |
| strong_cso | .911393 | .720000 |
| party_inst | .455696 | .782609 |
| ~soc_ten | .734177 | .805556 |
| aid_dep | .303798 | .827586 |
| ~leg_mil_rul | .721519 | .721519 |
| ~high_gov_rev | .632912 | .714286 |
| pre_reg_aut | .670886 | .706668 |

The high involvement of citizens in civil society organizations (strong_cso) is the only variable, which qualifies as a necessary condition for the withdrawal of the armed forces from power. The absence of social tensions and a legacy of civilian rule do not qualify as necessary but are close to the thresholds. While previous scholars have identified aid dependence as an important stepping stone for donors to pressurize juntas into power, the case-sensitive analysis

for the post-1989 sample comes to a different conclusion. Party institutionalization, high government revenue and the nature of the regime preceding the military coup are not relevant conditions for the armed forces' decision to depart from power.

As aid dependence is of interest to policy makers I test two additional models, which examine whether aid dependence becomes jointly necessary with high citizen involvement in civil society organization (model 2) and institutionalized parties (model 3). The results in Table 5 show that aid dependence becomes jointly necessary with the high involvement of citizens in civil society but not with institutionalized parties. Thus, if donors want to pressurize juntas into giving up power in the aftermath of a coup, they should foster local civil society organizations rather than channel money into the creation of strong political parties (Carothers 2006). In an addition step, I compare the results for a cluster of structural (model 4) and agency (model 5) conditions. This provides information about the extent to which actors have leverage over coup outcomes or whether structural conditions dictate the military's departure from power. Both display very similar scores for consistency and coverage, yet only the actor-centric conditions qualify as jointly necessary.

**Table 5: Analysis of Joint Necessary Conditions**

| outcome variable: mil_leave | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | conditions tested | consistency | coverage |
| 2 | party_inst+ aid_dep | .620253 | .777778 |
| 3 | strong_cso+ aid_dep | .924051 | .715686 |
| 4 | ~soc_ten+~leg_mil_rul+~high_gov_rev+ pre_reg_aut | .974684 | .652542 |
| 5 | strong_cso+ party_inst+ aid_dep | .949367 | .707547 |

Figure 2 reports the Truth Table for the sufficiency analysis for military withdrawal. Table 6 contain the causal pathways and the corresponding cases for the intermediate solution. Appendix IV contains the complex and the parsimonious solutions.

**Figure 2: Truth Table for Military Withdrawal**

| strong_cso | party_inst | soc_ten | aid_dep | leg_mil_rul | high_gov_rev | pre_reg_aut | number | mil_leave | raw consist. | PRI consist. | SYM consist. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.923077 | 0.888889 | 0.888889 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0.916667 | 0.875000 | 0.875000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0.916667 | 0.875000 | 0.875000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.888889 | 0.833333 | 0.833333 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0.833333 | 0.666667 | 0.666667 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.818182 | 0.600000 | 0.600000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.777778 | 0.600000 | 0.600000 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.777778 | 0.333333 | 0.333333 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.750000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.750000 | 0.333333 | 0.333333 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0.615385 | 0.375000 | 0.428571 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.600000 | 0.333333 | 0.333333 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.538462 | 0.333333 | 0.333333 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0.533333 | 0.300000 | 0.300000 |

For a causal pathway to be considered as relevant its consistency value should be at least .8 for aggregate entities (Ragin 2008, 1987) There is no threshold for coverage (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Table 6 outlines the intermediate results for the analysis of sufficiency. Appendix IV reports the results for the complex and parsimonious solutions. Since the intermediate results are more informative and since the complex and the parsimonious results do not add any substantial insights I do not discuss them in detail. The intermediate solution reveals four causal pathways that account for military withdrawal. The absence of social tensions combined with a strong civil society accounts for almost all cases in which the military withdrew from power. The pathway partly confirms the finding from the analysis of necessary condition: A high degree of citizen involvement in civil society organizations increases the costs of staying in power. The simultaneous absence of tangible social tensions means the ruler faction lacks a reasonable excuse for the prolongation of military rule. Overall this finding lends some credence to the assumption that the armed forces genuinely worry about domestic stability. The pathway does not cover the withdrawal of the armed forces in Ivory Coast in 1999, the Central African Republic in 2003 and Fiji in 2000. While the Fijian case is covered by another causal pathway, the cases of the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic are not covered by any of the causal pathways. Interestingly both experienced civil warfare in the aftermath of the post-coup elections.[14] This suggests that there were other conditions operating in the country, which are not caught by any of the variables. The remaining three pathways cover a comparatively small number of cases. The second pathway – the combination of the autocratic nature of the previous regime with the absence of high government revenue and the absence of social tensions – cover four cases of military

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14 The Ivorian civil war started in 2002. It ended in 2010. The civil war in the Central African Republic started in 2012. It ended in 2014.

withdrawal. The third pathway – the combination of the absence of high government revenue with the absence of former military rule and the presence of a strong civil society – covers four cases. The fourth and final pathway – the combination of previous autocratic rule with the absence of high government revenue with the absence of previous military rule with institutionalized party systems – covers only one case of military withdrawal.

**Table 6: Analysis of Sufficient Condition (Intermediate Solution)**

| | raw coverage | unique coverage | consistency | corresponding cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~soc_ten*strong_cso | .670886 | .291139 | .898305 | Guinea Bissau 2003; Guinea-Bissau 1999, Guinea 2008, Niger 2010, Burkina-Faso 2014, Honduras 2009, Lesotho 1991, Guinea-Bissau 2012, Bangladesh 2007, Mali 1991, Niger 1999, Thailand 1991, Thailand 2006, Cambodia 1997 |
| pre_reg_aut*~high_gov_rev*~soc_ten | .341772 | .025316 | .931035 | Guinea 2008, Mali 1991, Niger 1999, Niger 2010, Paraguay 1989, Cambodia 1997 |
| ~high_gov_rev*~leg_mil_rul* strong_cso | .468355 | .063291 | .860465 | Guinea-Bissau 2003, Guinea 2008, Guinea-Bissau 2012, Fiji 2000, Fiji 2006, Guinea Bissau 1999, Niger 2010, Mauritania 2008, Cambodia 1997, Mauritania 2005 |
| pre_reg_aut*~high_gov_rev*~leg_mil_rul*part_inst | .227848 | .000000 | .900000 | Niger 1999, Comoros 1999 |
| solution coverage | .822785 | | | |
| solution consistency | .822785 | | | |

**Empirical Analysis: The Armed Forces Staying in Power**

In a second step I examine the conditions, which encourage the military to remain in power. The asymmetrical nature of fsqca requires a separate analysis (Ragin 1987; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Ragin 2008). Table 7 shows the results for the analysis of necessity. No individual condition qualifies as necessary. There is also no combination of conditions which qualifies as jointly necessary.[15]

**Table 7: Analysis of Necessary Conditions**

| outcome variable: ~mil_leave | | |
|---|---|---|
| conditions tested | consistency | coverage |
| ~strong_cso | .450980 | .766667 |
| ~party_inst | .803921 | .488095 |
| soc_ten | .725490 | .637931 |
| ~aid_dep | .901961 | .455446 |
| leg_mil_rul | .568627 | .568627 |
| high_gov_rev | .607843 | .516667 |
| ~pre_reg_aut | .568627 | .527273 |

Figure 3 below outlines the Truth Table for the analysis of sufficiency.

**Figure 3: Truth Table for Military Remaining in Power**



File   Edit   Sort

| strong_cso | party_inst | soc_ten | aid_dep | leg_mil_rul | high_gov_rev | pre_reg_aut | number | ~mil_leave | raw consist. ▽ | PRI consist. | SYM consist |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 | 1.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.888889 | 0.666667 | 0.666667 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.875000 | 0.666667 | 0.666667 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.800000 | 0.666667 | 0.666667 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0.800000 | 0.700000 | 0.700000 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.769231 | 0.666667 | 0.666667 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.727273 | 0.400000 | 0.400000 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0.692308 | 0.500000 | 0.571429 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.666667 | 0.400000 | 0.400000 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.666667 | 0.333333 | 0.333333 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.444444 | 0.166667 | 0.166667 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0.416667 | 0.125000 | 0.125000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.416667 | 0.125000 | 0.125000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.384615 | 0.111111 | 0.111111 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.375000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.375000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.333333 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.300000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.300000 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.285714 | 0.000000 | 0.000000 |

As in the previous sections, I focus on the intermediate solution. The complex and the parsimonious solution are reported in Annex V. The analysis of sufficiency reveals three causal pathways. See Table 8 below. Two of the three pathways do not meet the .8 consistency threshold. The third pathway, a combination of the presence of a formerly autocratic regime,

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15 Results are with the author.

the absence of high government revenue, the absence of aid dependence, the presence of social tensions and the absence of a strong civil society, displays a very low coverage rate. It has one corresponding case. The withdrawal of the armed forces thus appears to be driven by other factors.

How can we make sense of this finding? It is important to recall the eminent position of the armed in the aftermath of a coup. As outlined at the beginning, the post-coup deliberations of the junta are not open to public scrutiny. It is an omitted variable by definition. In situations in which the ruler faction dominates the armed forces, prolonged military rule might be costly but the ruler factions might not be receptive to these costs or they might not be receptive to any condition which may decrease these costs. It appears that in cases in which the armed forces opt to remain in power, the outcome is largely a foregone conclusion. This is an equally important finding as it cautions scholars and policymakers to overestimate the leverage of civilian actors to influence post-coup outcomes.

**Table 8: Analysis of Sufficient Condition (Intermediate Solution)**

| | raw coverage | unique coverage | consistency | corresponding cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ~high_gov*aid_dep*soc_ten*~party_inst | .176471 | .078431 | .750000 | Mauritania 2005 |
| pre_reg_aut*~high_gov_rev*~aid_dep*soc_ten*~strong_cso | .137255 | .039216 | .875000 | Comoros 1999 |
| pre_reg_aut*~high_gov_rev*leg_mil_rul*~aid_dep*~party_inst*~strong_cso | .156863 | .058824 | 1.00000 | Paraguay 1989 |
| solution coverage | .274510 | | | |
| solution consistency | .777778 | | | |

**Conclusion**

The article has contributed to the recent and ongoing debate about the political consequences of military coups. Taking the resilience of autocratic rule into consideration, it reassessed the extent to which military juntas withdrew from or remained in power in the aftermath of a military coup. Overall, the article finds little to no reason to be optimistic about the democratization potential of military juntas. Although almost all post-1989 coups usher in post-coup elections, the armed forces managed to remain in power in roughly half of all cases. It is important to put these findings into the larger perspective on the burgeoning debate about coup outcomes. The findings do not contest the previous findings that post-1989 coups more frequently usher in post-coup elections. The end of the Cold War and the general normative bend toward democratization indeed have led to a decline of military dictatorship. Yet, instead of civilian rule, many countries experience prolonged military rule through civilian proxies, which represent the interests of the junta. In numerous cases these proxies are members of the former junta. Even juntas which withdraw from power contain visible ruler faction making future military intervention or the destabilization of the polity through parts of the armed forces a likely scenario. Drawing on fuzzy-set logic, the article identified two conditions, which are jointly sufficient to account for the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics: the presence of a strong civil society and the absence of social tensions. The combination of these two conditions covers all cases of military withdrawal with the sole exception of the Ivory Coast. Simultaneously the presence of a strong civil society qualifies as a necessary condition. On the one hand these are remarkable findings for a number of reasons. This points to the importance of endogenous conditions. Where citizens become involved in associational life and where societies do not suffer from ethnic or other social cleavages, military rule is too costly to maintain. By contrast, aid dependence, political party institutionalization, the legacy of previous military rule, government revenue or the nature of the previous regime to have any viable effect on the armed forces' decision to leave power. This has important implications for Western policy makers, who wish to pressurize juntas into leaving power. Democratization programs need to focus more on the establishment of robust civil societies and the long-term mitigation of structural conflicts. They should focus less on party building and be less excited about the alleged effect of aid dependency. On the other hand, these findings call for more research into the case of the Ivory Coast and the conditions, which might account for its deviant trajectory. The analysis of why armed the forces remain in power yielded somewhat disappointing results. None of the conditions put forward in this paper qualifies as necessary and the explanatory value of the identified causal pathways is generally

low. It seems that juntas, which prolong their stay in power are not receptive to outside influences. This provides s tern warning to the international community not to overestimate its leverage in nations that are under military rule.

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**Appendix I**
**Period between Coup and Post-Coup Election**

| Country | Coup date | Election date | Duration between coup and post-coup election |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paraguay 1989 | February 3, 1989 | May 1, 1991 | 3 months |
| Thailand 1991 | February 23, 1991 | September 13, 1992 | 20 months |
| Lesotho 1991 | April 30, 1991 | March 27, 1993 | 24 months |
| Mali 1991 | March 26, 1991 | April 12, 1992 | 14 months |
| Afghanistan 1992 | April 16, 1992 | missing | |
| Algeria 1992 | January 11, 1992 | November 16, 1995 | 47 months |
| Nigeria 1993 | November 17, 1993 | February 29, 1999 | 64 months |
| Gambia 1994 | July 22, 1994 | September 29, 1996 | 27 months |
| Niger 1996 | January 27, 1996 | July 8, 1996 | 6 months |
| Cambodia 1997 | July 5, 1997 | July 26, 1998 | 13 months |
| Pakistan 1999 | October 12, 1999 | August 18, 2008 | 226 months |
| Niger 1999 | April 11, 1999 | October 17, 1999 | 6 months |
| Ivory Coast 1999 | December 24, 1999 | October 22, 2000 | 10 months |
| Guinea Bissau 1999 | May 7, 1999 | November 28, 1999 (legislative); January 16, 2000 (presidential) | 6 months<br>8 months |
| Comoros 1999 | April 29, 1999 | April 14, 2002 | 35 months |
| Fiji 2000 | May, 26 2000 | August 25, 2001 | 17 months |
| Guinea Bissau 2003 | September 14, 2003 | March, 20, 2004<br>June 19, 2005 | 6 months<br>22 months |
| Central African Republic 2003 | March 15, 2003 | March 15, 2005 | 25 months |
| Mauritania 2005 | August 3, 2005 | March 11, 2007 | 20 months |
| Thailand 2006 | September 19, 2006 | December 23, 2007 | 16 months |
| Fiji 2006 | December 4, 2006 | September 14, 2014 | 90 months |
| Bangladesh 2007 | January 11, 2007 | December 24, 2008 | 24 months |
| Guinea 2008 | December 23, 2008 | June 27, 2010 | 19 months |
| Mauritania 2008 | August 6, 2008 | July 18, 2009 | 12 months |
| Honduras 2009 | June 28, 2009 | November 2009 | 5 months |
| Niger 2010 | February 19, 2010 | January 31, 2011 | 12 months |
| Egypt 2011 | February 12, 2011 | May 23, 2012 | 15 months |
| Guinea Bissau 2012 | April 12, 2012 | April 13, 2014 | 25 months |
| Egypt 2013 | July 13, 2013 | May 28, 2014 | 11 months |
| Burkina Faso 2014 | October 31, 2014 | November 29, 2015 | 14 months |

**Appendix II**
 **Membership Values of Outcome Variable**
**Short Description of Coup and Coup Outcome**

**Paraguay 1989**
The coup occurred on February 3, 1989. It ousted the government of General Alfredo Stroessner, an army officer who had seized power in 1954 and retained it for 35 years. Stroessner was overthrown by General Andres Rodriguez. General elections were held three months later. Rodriguez and his Colorado Party won the presidential and legislative elections. The military rigged the elections in favor of the Colorado Party.

Sources: Valenzuela (1997), Roett (1989), Latin America Studies Association (1994), Lambert (2000), Zagorski (2003), Abente Brun (2009).

**Lesotho 1991**
The coup occurred on April 30, 1991. The coup ousted the government of Major-General Lekhanya, who had come to power in 1986 through a military coup. Elections were held on March 27, 1993. The elections were regarded as free from fraud. The military neither participated nor intervened in the elections.

Sources: Southall (1994); Matlosa and Neville 2001, Africa Research Bulletin (various), EISA Election Observer Mission report 2012, Africa Yearbook (various)

**Mali 1991**
The coup occurred on March 26, 1991. It ended the regime of Moussa Traore's, who had seized power in a coup in 1968. Elections were held on April 12, 1992. The elections were regarded as generally competitive and the armed forces neither rigged nor participated in the elections. During the transition period a faction of the armed forces unsuccessfully staged a counter-coup. Until late 1994 a military coup against the newly elected government was likely.

Sources: Wing (2010), newspaper coverage (with the author)

**Thailand 1991**
On February 23, 1991 the Thai military overthrew the government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven. The coup was led by Supreme Commander Sundhara Kongsompong and Army Commander-in-Chief Suchinda Kraprayoon. The new junta called for elections, which took place on March 22. The armed forces created their own party (Samakhithan, Justice Unity Party) to contest the elections. The elections saw widespread vote-buying and other irregularities. Samakhithan and other pro-military parties won the elections narrowly.

Sources: Neher (1992), Christensen (1991), King (1992)

**Algeria 1992**
The military seized power on January 11, 1992 after the Islamic Salvation Front had emerged as the dominant political force after the first round of the scheduled two-round parliamentary elections in December 1991. Presidential elections took place on November 16, 1995. The

elections were contested by General Zeroual (candidate of the military) and three civilian candidates. The three major political parties did not participate in the elections.

Sources: Roberts (1998), Mortimer (1997), Roberts (1995), Bouandel and Zoubir (1998)


**Nigeria 1993**
Led by General Sani Abacha the military seized power on November 17, 1993. It removed the frail interim civilian administration led by Ernest Shonekan. The interim administration had been in power since the June 1993 elections, which had been annulled by the military. In 1995 and only due to immense domestic pressure Abacha announced a return to civilian rule. However in the run-up to the 1998 elections established a repressive regime and dissolved political parties and organizations. The political parties, which were allowed to form all nominated Abacha as their presidential nominee. The largest party, the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) was the army's political proxy. Sani Abacha remained in power until his death in June 1998. His successor General Abdulsalam Abubakar undertook dramatic political reforms and paved the way for legislative and presidential elections in February 1999.

Sources: Congressional Research Service (2005), Ihonvbere (1996), Welch (1995), Lewis (1994)


**Gambia 1994**
The military under leadership of Captain Yayah Jammeh overthrew the civilian government of Sir Dawda Jawara. Presidential elections took place on September 26. The elections were contested by Jammeh and his newly formed Alliance for Patriotism, Reorientation and Construction (APRC). A military decree excluded the formerly dominant parties as well as all previous officeholders. This de facto decapitated the opposition. The run-up to the elections also saw intimidation and violence against Jammeh-opponents by state-sponsored groups.

Sources: Sadowski-Smith (2002), Highes (2000), Saine (1996), Wiseman (1998).


**Cambodia 1997**
On July 1997 the armed forces removed the first Prime Minister (and prince of Cambodia), Narodom Ranariddh from power. Ranarriddh's National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (Funcinpec) had emerged as the strongest political force in the 1993 elections. The armed forces acted at the behest of Hun Sen, the second Prime Minister and leader of the Cambodian People's Party, CPP) who had served as a Khmer Rouge commander. The CPP was the party of the administrative elite and the security apparatus. Rabariddkh and other members of Funcinpec were forces to flee the country. Subsequently they were convicted by a military coup to 30 years in prison. In the run-up to the 1998 legislative elections the CPP used state propaganda and intimidation in order to garner votes. Funcinpec also contested the 1998 election, yet their supporters and candidates were subjected to harassment and death threats.

Sources: Woods (1997), Hughes (2002), Downie (2001), McCargo (2002) Downie and Kingsbury (2001), Roberts (2002)

**Niger 1999 (and 1996)**

The coup occurred on April 11, 1999. It ended the regime of Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, who had claimed power in a military coup in 1996. Elections were held on October 17, 1999. They were regarded as free from fraud and led to a return of civilian rule. The military neither participated nor intervened in the elections.

Sources: Elischer (2015), Souley (2008), Africa Yearbook, Africa Confidential, Villalon and Abdurahmane (2005)

**Pakistan 1999**

On October 12, 1999 General Pervez Musharraf ousted Nawaz Sharif from the presidency. In 2002 the military junta held a fraudulent referendum, which allowed Musharraf to extend his stay in power for an additional five years and which transferred power from the legislature to the presidency. In 2007 Musharraf used extraconstitutional means to extend his stay in power for another 5 years. He was forced to resign on August 18, 2008.

Sources: Rizvi (2000), Shah (2014), Diamond (2000), Kennedy (2005), Talbot (2003), Malik(2002),

**Guinea-Bissau 1999, 2003 and 2012**

1999

On May 7 1999 the military under the leadership of General Mane ousted the civilian and democratically elected government of Joao Vieira of the PAIGC party. The PAIGC represented the interest of the armed forces. Mane and parts of the junta suggested several times that the army should establish absolute political control for a period of ten years. There were clearly visible attempts by the armed forces to impose military rule. Nevertheless competitive elections took place in November 1999; competitive presidential elections followed in January 2000. Both elections were won by the RPS. A visible section of the armed forces supported the PAIGC. Mane and other officers stated that they would establish military co-rule in case the RPS won.

2003

On September 14 2003 the military ousted democratically elected President Yala. The coup was led by General Verissimo Seabre. The junta put in place a civilian interim government. Competitive legislative elections took place in March 2004. Competitive presidential elections took place in June 2005. Both resulted in the victory of the PAIGC and former President Vieira. The military neither participated nor intervened in the elections.

2012

On April 12 2012 the army arrested the Prime Minister and PAIGC presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Junior, who was likely to be elected president in the second round of the presidential elections. The military established a National Transitional Council led by civilian leaders. The junta withdrew form power on May 22, 2012. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held on April 13, 2014. The PAIGC won both. The elections were competitive. The army neither participated nor intervened in the elections.

Sources: International Crisis Group (2008), Embalo (2012), O'Regan (2015), Ferreira (2004), Shaw (2015).

**Ivory Coast 1999**
The coup occurred on December 24, 1999. It ended the civilian regime of Aimé Henri Konan Bédié, who had governed Ivory Coast since 1993. The elections took place on October 22, 2000. The leader of the military junta General Robert Gueï decided to contest the election a few weeks before election day. A faction of the military rigged the election in Gueï' favor but parts of the army abandoned him. Gueï lost the election.

Sources: Chirot (Chirot 2006), Daddieh (2001), Toungara (2001), N'Diaye (2000)

**Comoros 1999**
On April 30, 1999 Colonel Azali Assoumani overthrew the civilian interim president Tadjidine Massounde after two islands, Anjouan, and Mohéli had tried to secede from the Comoros. The junta leader agreed to hold elections on each of the three islands, which were considered competitive the presidential elections for the island federation took place on April 14, 2002. Assoumani contested the elections as presidential candidate. The other candidates boycotted the elections. The electoral commission declared the elections not to be free and fair but the junta dissolved the electoral body.

Sources: Rich (2008), Walker (2007), State Department Human Rights Reports, Freedom House

**Fiji 2000**
On May 25, 2000, the Fiji military declared martial law after the democratically elected government had been held hostage for several days by a paramilitary militia. The military appoints a civilian caretaker government. Elections take place in August 2001. The military neither participates nor intervenes in these elections.

Sources: Lal (2002), Lal (2006)

**Central African Republic 2003**
On March 15, 2003, a faction of the armed forces under the leadership of Francois Bozize overthrew the democratically elected President Ange-Felix Patasse. Bozize established the National Transitional Council (CNT), which was an all-party body and served as the interim legislative organization. Presidential and legislative elections took place on March 15 2005. Boizize contested the presidential elections supported by the Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), a platform of smaller parties. The elections suffered from various irregularities. Boizize emerged victorious.

Sources: Mehler (2003), Lindberg and Clark (2008), McGowan (2003), Economic Intelligence Unit, Africa Yearbook

**Mauritania 2005 and 2008**
On August 3, 2005, the military under the leadership of Colonel Ely Ould Mohammed Vall overthrew the regime of Ould Taya. Taya had come to power through coup in 1984. The junta drafted a new constitution and promised to hand power to elected civilians. On December 3,

2006 legislative elections took place. On March 11 2007 presidential elections took place. The junta did not participate in them and the elections were widely seen as the first free and fair elections in the history of Mauritania.

On August 8, 2008 the military overthrew the democratically elected civilian regime of Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. The leading figure behind the coup was Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a long-term aid of former military ruler Taya and head of the presidential guard. Aziz announced that he would contest the presidential elections. For this pupose the military changed the constitution in order to allow military officers to contest presidential elections. Presidential elections were held on July 18, 2009. The elections were seen as fraudulent by the opposition. International election experts stated that the timeframe between the establishment of the electoral commission and election day were too short for orderly elections to take place. Aziz won the first round of the elections by a sizable margin.

Sources: N'Diaye (2009), Zisenwie (2011), Foster(2011), NDI (2009), Hochman (2009), Fakir and Boucek (2010)

**Thailand 2006**
The coup occurred on September 19, 2006. The military overthrows the regime of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Although democratically elected the civilian regime concentrated power and engaged in widespread corruption. The army redrafted the constitution. The military neither participated nor intervened in the parliamentary elections in December 2007.

Sources: Ockey (2008), Pathmanand (2008), Pongsudhirak (2008), Connors and Hewison (2008), Schafferer (2008).

**Fiji 2006**
The coup occurred on September 19, 2006, only seven months after Fiji had elected a new government. The coup was led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama. The military stayed in power for close to eight years. Elections took place on September 17, 2014. The junta participated in the elections and formed the Fiji First party, which gained a parliamentary majority in parliament. The Fiji First party was led by Bainimarama. The junta manipulated the electoral rules in favor of Bainimarama. Various other parties also contested the elections and were represented in parliament.

Sources: Fraenkel (2015), Lal (2007), Firth (2015), Lal (2013)

**Bangladesh 2007**
On January 11, 2007 the Bangladeshi army declared a state of emergency and established a caretaker government jointly led by Dr, Ahmed, a World Bank official, and General Ahmed, the chief of army. The caretaker government remained in power until December 24, 2008 when legislative and presidential elections were held. The military neither participated nor intervened in these elections.

Sources: Hagerty (2008), Momen (2010), Milam (2007), Robinson and Sattar (2012)

**Guinea 2008**
Data is with the author

**Niger 2010**
Data is with the author

**Appendix III**
**Data Sources and Mode of Calibration for Causal Conditions**

**strong_cso: citizen involvement in civil society organizations**
data source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset.
The VDEM dataset measures citizen involvement on a scale between 1 (voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them) and 3 (there are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least).
mode of calibration: direct
measurement period: three years prior to the coup, the coup year and one year after the coup
calibration: The maximum possible score is 15 (five country years by three).
threshold for full membership: 12.5
crossover point: 8
threshold for full nonmembership: 5

**party_inst: party system institutionalization**
data source: Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset
VDEM measures the various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature.
mode of calibration: direct
measurement period: five years prior to and one year after the coup.
calibration: The maximum possible score is six (six country years by one).
threshold for full membership: 5.5
crossover point: 4
threshold for full nonmembership: 1.5

**soc_ten: social tension**

data source: secondary literature, datasets on conflicts, open-source data

The condition examines the degree to which social tension pose a threat to security and stability.

mode of calibration: qualitative; for sources see Appendix II

| degree of social conflict/ cleavage | membership value |
|---|---|
| *national conflict*<br>conflict(s) between two or more numerically strong groups<br>conflict(s) between national government and one or several numerically dominant groups | 1 |
| *national conflict*<br>conflict(s) between one numerically strong group and one or a few numerically small groups at the national level<br>conflict(s) between national government and a few numerically small groups | .8 |
| *national conflict*<br>conflict(s) between a few numerically small groups<br>conflict(s) between national government and one numerically small group | .6 |
| *regional conflict*<br>conflict between one numerically strong group and one or a few numerically small groups<br>conflict between national government and a numerically strong group | .4 |
| *regional conflict*<br>conflict between a few numerically small groups<br>conflict between national government and one or a few small groups | .2 |
| *no conflict* | 0 |

**aid_dep: aid dependence**
data source: OECD and World Bank, secondary literature on donor countries
The condition examines the degree of aid dependency, the concentration of aid in the hands of individual donors and the presence (or lack) of a democratization strategy of a particular donor
mode of calibration: indirect
calibration: qualitative

| degree of aid dependency | degree of concentration | dominant donor(s) | membership value |
|---|---|---|---|
| very high (>50%) | concentrated | democracy promotor | 1 |
| | | autocracy promotor | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .6 |
| | moderately concentrated | democracy promotors | .8 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .6 |
| | dispersed | democracy promotors | .6 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .4 |
| high (20% - 49%) | concentrated | democracy promotor | 1 |
| | | autocracy promotor | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .6 |
| | moderately concentrated | democracy promotors | .8 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .4 |
| | dispersed | democracy promotors | .6 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .6 |
| low (6% - 19%) | concentrated | democracy promotor | .4 |
| | | autocracy promotor | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | .2 |
| | moderately concentrated | democracy promotors | .2 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | 0 |
| | dispersed | democracy promotors | 0 |
| | | autocracy promotors | 0 |
| | | multilateral donors | 0 |
| very low (< 5%) | concentrated | democracy promotor | .2 |
| | otherwise | | 0 |

**leg_military_rule: previous military participation in government**
data source:  Autocracies in the World Dataset
The condition examines the duration of military rule in the decades prior to the coup
From this I calculate the percentage of years the country has been under military rule over the course of one generation (30 years).
mode of calibration: direct
measurement period: thirty years prior to the coup (one generation)
The maximum cumulative score is 100%.

threshold for full membership: 90%
crossover point: 65%
threshold for full nonmembership: 20%


**high_gov_rev: high government revenue**
data source: OECD and World Bank
The condition examines the revenue size of governments.
mode of calibration: direct
measurement period: ten years prior to the coup and during the coup year in current USD
threshold for full membership: 100 billion
crossover point: 50 billion
threshold for full nonmembership: 10 billion


**pre_regime_auth**
data source: Freedom House
The condition examines the degree of authoritarianism of the previous regime
mode of calibration: qualitative
measurement period: average of scores for the three years preceding the coup
threshold for full membership: 6
crossover point: 3.5
threshold for full nonmembership: 2

**Appendix IV**
**Complex and Parsimonious Solutions for the Analysis of Sufficiency for the Military Withdrawing from Power**

**Complex Solution**

| | raw coverage | unique coverage | consistency | corresponding cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| strong_cso*~party_inst*~aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev | .278481 | .025317 | .814815 | Guinea 2008 Guinea-Bissau 2012 Fiji 2000 Fiji 2006 Mauritania 2008 Cambodia 1997 |
| strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev | .278481 | .037975 | .956522 | Guinea-Bissau 2003 Guinea 2008 Guinea-Bissau 2012 Lesotho 1991 Guinea-Bissau 1999 Cambodia 1997 |
| strong_cso*~party_inst*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_aut_gov | .316456 | .012658 | .862069 | Guinea 2008 Lesotho 1991 Cambodia 1997 Fiji 2006 Mauritania 2005 |
| strong_cso*~soc_ten*~aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*high_gov_rev*~pre_aut_gov | .189873 | .101266 | .937500 | Burkina Faso 2014 Honduras 2009 Bangladesh |

| | | | | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*~aid_dep*leg_mil_rul* high_gov_rev | .113924 | .063291 | .818182 | Thailand 1991 Thailand 2006 |
| strong_cso*party_inst*~soc_ten*~aid_dep*~high_gov_rev* pre_aut_gov | .126582 | .037975 | 1.000000 | Niger 1999 Niger 2010 |
| strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*aid_dep*~high_gov_rev* pre_aut_gov | .151899 | .025317 | 1.000000 | Lesotho 1991 Mali 1991 |
| ~strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*aid_dep*leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev* pre_aut_gov | .037975 | .025317 | .750000 | Paraguay 1989 |
| ~strong_cso*party_inst*soc_ten*~aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev* pre_aut_gov | .075949 | .000000 | .750000 | Comoros 1999 |
| solution coverage | .708861 | | | |
| solution consistency | .835821 | | | |

**Parsimonious Solution**

| | raw coverage | unique coverage | consistency | corresponding cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| strong_cso*~pre_aut_gov | .493671 | .025316 | .812500 | Thailand 1991<br>Guinea Bissau 1999<br>Guinea Bissau 2003<br>Guinea Bissau 2012<br>Burkina Faso 2014<br>Mauritania 2008<br>Honduras 2009<br>Bangladesh 2007<br>Fiji 2000 |
| strong_cso*~ high_gov_rev | .556962 | 0.000000 | .814815 | Mali 1991<br>Guinea Bissau 1999<br>Guinea Bissau 2003<br>Lesotho 1991<br>Niger 1999<br>Guinea 2008<br>Guinea Bissau 2012<br>Mauritania 2008<br>Fiji 2000<br>Fiji 2006<br>Mauritania 2005<br>Niger 2010<br>Cambodia 1997 |
| strong_cso*~soc_ten | .670886 | .075949 | .898305 | Guinea Bissau 1999<br>Guinea Bissau 2003<br>Guinea 2008<br>Niger 2010<br>Burkina Faso 2014<br>Honduras 2009<br>Lesotho 1991<br>Guinea Bissau 2012<br>Bangladesh 2007 |

| | | | | Mali 1991<br>Niger 1999<br>Thailand 1991<br>Thailand 2006<br>Cambodia 1997 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| soc_ten*~ high_gov_rev | .202532 | .012658 | .571429 | Comoros 1999<br>Fiji 2000<br>Mauritania 2005<br>Mauritania 2008<br>Fiji 2006 |
| ~ high_gov_rev* pre_aut_gov | .468355 | .000000 | .822222 | Lesotho 1991<br>Mali 1991<br>Niger 1999<br>Guinea 2008<br>Mauritania 2005<br>Niger 2010<br>Comoros 1999<br>Paraguay 1989<br>Cambodia 1997<br>Fiji 2006 |
| ~soc_ten* pre_aut_gov | .481013 | .0000000 | .883721 | Lesotho 1991<br>Mali 1991<br>Niger 1999<br>Guinea 2008<br>Mauritania 2005<br>Niger 2010<br>Comoros 1999<br>Paragay 1989<br>Cambodia 1997<br>Mali 1991<br>Niger 1999<br>Niger 2010<br>Thailand 2006 |

| | |
|---|---|
| solution coverage | .886076 |
| solution consistency | .721650 |

**Appendix V**
**Complex and Parsimonious Solutions for the Analysis of Sufficiency for the Military Remaining in Power**

**Complex Solutions**

```
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.875000

                                                                    raw          unique
                                                                 coverage      coverage     consistency
                                                                ----------    ----------   ----------
~strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*~aid_dep*leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut    0.078431      0.058824      1.000000
~strong_cso*party_inst*soc_ten*~aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut     0.137255      0.058824      0.875000
strong_cso*~party_inst*soc_ten*aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut      0.156863      0.078431      0.888889
solution coverage: 0.274510
solution consistency: 0.875000



Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~strong_cso*~party_inst*~soc_ten*~aid_dep*leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut: Par_1989 (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~strong_cso*party_inst*soc_ten*~aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut: Com_99 (0.6,0.8)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term strong_cso*~party_inst*soc_ten*aid_dep*~leg_mil_rul*~high_gov_rev*pre_reg_aut: Maur_05 (0.6,0.6)
```

**Parsimonious Solution**

```
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.875000

                        raw         unique
                     coverage     coverage    consistency
                     ----------   ----------  ----------
~strong_cso*pre_reg_aut   0.352941     0.254902     0.782609
soc_ten*aid_dep           0.176471     0.078431     0.692308
solution coverage: 0.431373
solution consistency: 0.709678



Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~strong_cso*pre_reg_aut: Par_1989 (0.8,0.6),
  Com_99 (0.6,0.8)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term soc_ten*aid_dep: Maur_05 (0.8,0.6)
```