Electoral engineering and inclusion of ethnic groups

Ethnic minorities in parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries

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February 2006

Abstract

Inter-ethnic fire was set in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the communist regimes. This resulted in discrimination of groups of citizens and in violent conflicts. An important aspect of power-sharing regimes and of the discrimination or integration of minority groups is the way, in which parliaments are elected. Parliamentary elections may accelerate the flames – or they may be attempts to extinguish them. To a certain degree, the elections’ success in fire extinguishing relies on the electoral systems.

In this article, I shall test if electoral systems are favourable to ethnic minority integration. For that purpose, I explore three questions: 1. Do they enable ethnic minority parties to gain representation in parliament? 2. Do they allow a plurality amongst ethnic minority parties? 3. Do they support a policy of conciliation by giving incentives to vote for mixed-ethnic parties? Or do they on the contrary hinder their success?

My empirical test on a database covering 106 ethnic minorities in Central and European countries confirms the importance of electoral laws for the representation of ethnic minority parties. More concretely, my tests using the Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA) show that if proportional electoral systems are amended with high national thresholds, even medium-sized territorially concentrated ethnic minorities are excluded from parliament. And any kind of plurality of single-member district systems may be poison for the representation of not-concentrated minorities and exclude local minorities.

1. Why electoral engineering should consider the ethnic composition of a country

“Electoral engineering” was an important idea in the institution building process in post-communist European democracies. This means that electoral rules were designed to establish a certain kind of party systems (Shvetsova 2003). However, the impact of those electoral laws on ethnic minority representation was not an important topic in electoral system research.

Previous research has shown that the integration of all relevant social groups into the political institutions is of crucial importance to the quality of democracy. Both Lijphart (1994a) and Norris (2005) point out the importance of proportional representation for that aim, as this electoral system allows the representation of all social groups. Or, in the words of Doorenspleet (2005: 366): “Majority rule is dangerous in divided societies, because minorities that are continually denied access to political power will feel excluded and discriminated against by the regime.”

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1 This paper has been presented at the internal “Séminaire du Staff” at the Departement for Political Science at the University of Geneva, 1 February 2006. Many thanks to Tucker Brabec, Alex Fischer, Sarah Nicolet, Pascal Sciarini and Sakura Yamasaki for their helpful comments and for corrections.

Online: http://www.unige.ch/ses/spo/staff/corpsinter/bochsler/minorities
Undoubtedly, electoral rules have an important effect on ethnic minority representation (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 1985; Toplak 2001). Theory treats “power sharing” institutions as a means to accommodate all social groups in the political system (Lijphart 1994b). Proportional representation systems for the elections to parliaments are considered to be such an inclusive “power sharing” institution, while plurality elections (“the winner takes all”) are exclusive (Duverger 1951; Taagepera/Shugart 1989). But this “classical” electoral system theory may not be applied so straightforward to ethnic minority representation like some authors claim. In fact, most ethnic groups in Central-Eastern Europe are geographically concentrated. And this characteristic has an important impact on the functioning of electoral systems (cf. Friedman 2005: 381f.).

Rarely noticed literature on electoral systems and party systems shows that the electoral system effect is almost reverse for minority groups that live on a concentrated territory (cf. Riker 1982; Barkan 1995). In other words: in contrast with the common theory, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities in many cases should prefer plurality electoral systems: In their regional “strongholds” they are able to get even more than proportional seat share. On the other hand, minorities dispersed throughout the country prefer proportional representation (cf. OSCE 2001). Furthermore, many Central and Eastern European states introduced different models of special electoral rules for ethnic minority parties (cf. Cesid 2002; Jovanovic 2004). Yet, they may have unwanted consequences, promoting ethnic segregation instead of giving incentives to mixed-ethnic political parties.

In this paper, I investigate which electoral rules in Central-East Europe are able to integrate which ethnic minorities into the national legislative bodies. I test if electoral systems are suited for ethnic minorities according to three aspects:

1. Can each electoral minority group be adequately represented in parliament with its own political parties?
2. Can ethnic minorities be represented by several political parties (in those cases where the second-largest party of the ethnic minority counts for at least the vote share of one seat in parliament)?
3. Does the electoral system allow – or better encourage – mixed-ethnic parties?

The Central and Eastern European Countries are particularly suited for my analysis for three reasons: First, the countries of this region possess all these most common electoral systems. Second, they are ethnically mixed to a very high degree, and count both territorially concentrated and dispersed ethnic minority groups of different sizes. And third, the issue of ethnic minority representation has lead to special electoral rules in some of the countries, while in others the question of ethnic representation seems unsatisfactorily resolved.

Each of the three aspects shall be discussed in one of the following three sections of this paper; the electoral systems shall be assessed according to the three aspects. Thanks to a novel database on party systems and electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe, I provide empirical data on ethnic minorities, electoral systems and political parties in the region. For the first (main) aspect (representation of ethnic minority parties), the empirical analysis will be broad, and carried out...
systematically, based on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis approach (QCA). The second and third aspects will be only briefly discussed, and a proper empirical test of the hypotheses is not possible for the countries under study. In the last section, I conclude.

2. The electoral systems and the representation of ethnic groups (1st aspect)

My first (and main) aspect to test is the possibility for each electoral minority group to be adequately represented in parliament with its own political parties.

As a first step, I shall show the importance of this aspect for the fair integration of ethnic minorities into the countries’ institutions. Then, I characterise the most common electoral systems (i.e. different kinds of proportional representation, plurality or majority vote, mixed electoral systems) and develop hypotheses regarding the representation of ethnic minority parties. In the following paragraphs, these considerations shall be tested on Central and Eastern European countries. The hypotheses may best be tested by the means of Qualitative Comparative Analyses (QCA).

2.1. The importance of ethnic minority parties

There are several ways how ethnic minorities may participate in political life. Aside from participation in elections, there are opportunities to participate in non-elected political institutions – political parties, associations or village councils – or to take part in other forms of political articulation like demonstrations, consumer’s actions or other form of public action. Some governments in the region under investigation have formed special bodies for ethnic minority groups (for instance Roma councils; cf. Sobotka 2001).

However, the representation of ethnic minorities if reduced to special bodies may exclude them from effective decision-making. If they are not appropriately represented on all government levels and included in decisions, this would rather assemble a tyranny of the majority which tends to ignore the interests of the minority and which appears unjust (cf. Norman 2001: 96; Mansbridge 2000). Further, a non-representation may have the consequence of a loss of legitimacy for the institutions in question.

Hence, adequate representation of ethnic minorities in parliaments seems important for two reasons: First, it allows ethnic minorities to take part in determining the country’s laws. Second, governments in the region rely on the confidence of the parliament. As a consequence, the representation in the legislative chamber may be necessary to be represented in the executive.²

In which way should ethnic minority be represented? Through mixed-ethnic parties (which appeal to voters of several ethnic groups) or through ethnic minority parties (which appeal to voters of the ethnic minority)?

The integrative school argues that it is of advantage for the prevention of ethnic conflicts that moderating and mixed-ethnic political parties are elected instead of ethnic minority parties which allegedly reinforce the ethnic segregation (Reilly 2001). However, there are two main points that underline why it is important that ethnic minority parties can become represented in parliament:

² However, this last relationship is not always necessary. In very special cases, ethnic minority parties may be included into the government without being represented in parliament. However, it appears plausible that representation in parliament is usually a condition to participate in the government and in public decision-making.
First, the interest of mixed-ethnic parties is not of universal value. If ethnic conflicts become too deep, representation through mixed-ethnic parties may not be satisfactory or even dangerous for the interests of the minority groups. Then, it is of crucial importance that ethnic minorities are represented by their own organisations.

Second, if ethnic minorities may compete and succeed with their own political parties in elections, this strengthens their political power. Certainly, integrative political institutions may be aspired to, as they are thought to have positive effects for the development of inter-ethnic relationships and ethnic reconciliation. We may regard mixed-ethnic political parties as a form of such integrative inter-ethnic political institutions. In consociational power-sharing systems, the balance of power is typically subject to bargaining between (ethnic) parties. The possibility to form ethnically based parties is the basis of the bargaining power of ethnic minorities. If, however, they do not have this possibility, mixed-ethnic parties may ignore the policy requests of ethnic minorities.3

If I mention the possibility of being adequately represented, this implies that the representation through mixed-ethnic minority parties is not treated as a disadvantage. This is why I stress the possibility of ethnic party formation. The expression adequate representation stresses that ethnic minorities should have the possibility – if competing with their own electoral parties – to win a share of seats that at least corresponds to their vote share.

2.2. Electoral systems in interaction with the territorial structure of ethnic groups
The theory I shall discuss in this section concerns the impact of electoral systems on party systems. Many articles limit themselves to the distinction between proportional representation (PR) and plurality or majority voting systems (commonly called single-member district systems, SMD). While PR allows representation of minority groups, SMD elections usually lead to a concentration of the party system to two major players (Duverger 1951). More recent studies point out the importance of other characteristics of electoral systems: Taagepera and Shugart (1989) found that from this perspective, the constituency size is the most important characteristic of electoral systems. Small constituencies appear – at the local/regional level – as thresholds against small parties. Hence, they lead to a concentration in the number of parties in the constituency and thus are treated as effective thresholds (Lijphart 1994c: 29). Some countries in Central and Eastern Europe combine proportional and either majority or plurality vote in mixed electoral systems. In these countries, one part of the parliamentary seats is accorded by majority or plurality rules, while the other part through proportional representation. Accordingly, the expected effects of mixed electoral systems are a combination of the effects of both systems.

3 Only the possibility to split and form an their own electoral alternative gives ethnic minorities the necessary blackmail power. This allows them to bargain and to gain sufficient importance in the formulation of policies and in the distribution of political offices. If, on the contrary, ethnic minorities do not have the possibility of forming their own political movements, they have no alternative other than giving their vote for one of the major national political parties. Consequently, the ethnic majority does not have to care properly for the interests of ethnic minority voters.
Nationalisation constraints and (geographically) concentrated ethnic groups

Many considerations of electoral systems end here; other mechanisms are considered irrelevant – or rather “complicated features” (in the words of Benoit 2002: 11), so that they are left aside. In accounting for the number of parties in a homogeneous country, these “complicated features” indeed may have less impact. However, when investigating for the success of ethnic minority parties in socially heterogeneous countries, those additional features may be of crucial importance.

Such are the legal national thresholds, which are often subsumed together with district thresholds. District thresholds (often called effective thresholds) are the result of a limited number of seats in the electoral districts. Consequently, if constituencies are small, they allow – in a certain district – only large parties to win parliamentary seats. Thus, a political party needs electoral strongholds in order to meet these thresholds. National thresholds (or “nationalisation constraints”) work in a completely different way: By law, only parties that win more than a certain percentage of votes are accorded seats. Those countries in Central and Eastern Europe that recently introduced such national legal thresholds set them around 4-6% of the national votes. While district thresholds require political parties to be strong in one or several regions to get elected, national thresholds only concern national vote shares.

When parties have homogeneous support throughout the country, this distinction is not of particular relevance; then it is important that they have a sufficiently large support to meet the threshold on the district or the national level. However, it is of crucial importance in societies where social groups are divided by territorial borders. The latter is typically the case for many ethnic minorities.

This may be illustrated with the example of two different territorial configurations of ethnic groups and their electoral success.

Arithmetically speaking, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities have a considerably higher share of population in their homelands than on average nationwide. This has consequences for the support and electoral success of ethnic minority parties, as shown. If we compare two ethnically defined parties with a similar countrywide vote share: one related to a geographically concentrated ethnic group; the other related to a group that is spread through the country. The first party (party A; a geographically concentrated ethnic group) gets in some regions considerably more support than the national average. For the second party (party B; countrywide dispersed ethnic group), however, support in every region is near to the national average.

In a first example, PR with a national legal threshold is applied for both parties. If this threshold lies above the vote share of the parties, both fall short of representation in parliament. Only their national vote share counts for success in elections, no matter the regional structure of their support. If, however, the vote share of the parties lies above the national threshold, both get elected to parliament.

In a second example, an electoral law with electoral districts – but without any national threshold – is applied. The smaller the number of seats per district, the larger the effective threshold in the single districts. If expressed in numbers, in a district with N seats, only parties with a vote share of at least 1/(N+1) are sure of success in elections (Taagepera 1998). For party A, whose affiliated ethnic group is geographically concentrated, this effective threshold should not matter: Even if nationally weak, their regional vote share is rather high and thus they can easily meet the effective threshold in the districts where its ethnic group lives. For party B however, small districts – and
consequently large effective thresholds – are fatal. If the effective thresholds are above the average national vote share, the party fails in every single district. Due to its dispersed support, party B has no particular strongholds where it gets an above average vote share – and where it could meet the effective threshold (Bochsler 2005) (see table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportional representation (with constituencies).</th>
<th>Ethnic minority dispersed throughout the country</th>
<th>Ethnic minority geographically concentrated in one or several regions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As ethnic minority parties count for only a (small) minority of votes in each constituency, they are likely to fail short the threshold in every single district. Only large minorities may succeed.</td>
<td>In the region(s) where the ethnic minority lives, it is likely to fulfill the district threshold. In the other regions, the district threshold does not matter, as there are no votes for the ethnic minority parties in any case.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Proportional representation with a (considerable) national legal threshold.</th>
<th>The ethnic minority parties fall short the threshold, unless the ethnic minority is larger than required by the relative threshold on the national level.</th>
<th>-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ethnic group wins all the seats, as it holds the majority of votes in the region where it resides (and is majoritarian).</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plurality or majority elections in single-member districts.</th>
<th>In every constituency the ethnic minority parties count for only a minority of the votes. They are not able to get a plurality or majority of votes in any district.</th>
<th>The ethnic minority parties are in some cases spared from legal thresholds in electoral laws. Hence, if a political party belongs to an ethnic minority, it is allowed seat allocation even if not meeting the legal threshold.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Allow the formation of ethnic minorities that are affected by the special rules.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Special electoral rules | Ethic minority parties for those ethnic minority parties that are affected by the special rules. | + | + |

**Table 1:** Expected effects of electoral rules, dependent on the territorial structure of ethnic groups. Expected outcomes (for middle-sized ethnic minorities): + represented; - not represented.

Special electoral rules
In contrast, some countries provide particular electoral rules for their ethnic minorities. There are several possibilities for the protection of ethnic minorities.

- Electoral minorities cast their votes in their own, special districts. Each ethnic minority elects its deputies in a special, non-territorial district.
- Proportional electoral laws may provide a minimal number of guaranteed seats for ethnic minority parties. This allows ethnic minority parties to compete in the same districts as non-ethnic (or ethnic majority) parties, but a number of seats are reserved to ensure that ethnic minority parties do not fail the threshold.
- Ethnic minority parties are in some cases spared from legal thresholds in electoral laws. Hence, if a political party belongs to an ethnic minority, it is allowed seat allocation even if not meeting the legal threshold.
The above rules thus guarantee that ethnic minorities may get appropriate representation in parliament. In contrast, legislation in some countries (Albania, Bulgaria) forbids political parties founded on ethnic grounds.

2.3. Tested hypotheses
As a first step, I shall test the following hypotheses about the possibility of ethnic minority party formation for the described electoral systems. The representation of an ethnic minority with their own party (or several) in parliament is only possible if
1. ethnic minority parties are not forbidden by law⁴ and
2. at least one of the following characteristics applies:
   a: The electoral law provides special districts for the ethnic minority.
   b: PR with electoral districts, but without national threshold is applied, and the ethnic minority amounts to at least the population share of one parliamentary seat and this population lives in a concentrated area.
   c: A single-member district system is applied and the ethnic minority group makes up the majority of the local population, e.g. lives concentratedly.
   d: PR with national threshold is applied and the ethnic minority group is large.

Hence, my model suggests that ethnic minorities may only be represented if, first, national legislation that does not forbid them and, second, one (or several) of the four configurations (a-d) of electoral laws and ethnic minority structure applies. However, those configurations do not necessarily lead to ethnic minority parties; they rather allow ethnic minority parties to exist: There are still cases where ethnic minorities for instance join mixed-ethnic parties or do not mobilise enough voters to vote for them.

2.4. The methodology
I carried out the test of the hypotheses based on a database on electoral results from Central and Eastern Europe, which includes a series of data on ethnic minorities and their treatment in electoral laws. Finally, I had to identify if the elected parties represented an ethnic minority. The data consider the latest legislative electoral contest in the Central and Eastern European countries.⁵

Qualitative Comparative Analysis – method and notation
According to my model, there are several paths, which allow the existence of ethnic minority parties. Each of those multiple causal paths consist of conjunctional terms, which are measured with binary variables; hence a typical example of “multiple conjunctional causality” (Ragin 1987).

⁴ This independent variable may appear obvious or even tautological. Still, it is important for my analysis, being the reason why some ethnic minorities may not be represented by a party. Furthermore, it would not have been meaningful to exclude both countries that know such a rule (Albania, Bulgaria) from the analysis, because the ban on ethnic minority parties is – inconsequently – not applied to the parties of all ethnic minorities. Hence, we may differentiate amongst minorities in Albania and Bulgaria; see the description of the variable “BAN” below.

⁵ As the legislative of Serbia and Montenegro is not directly elected and furthermore the confederal institutions of this country have almost no importance, I include the republic parliaments of Serbia and of Montenegro (similar like Horowitz/Browne 2005) and furthermore – as this province is in fact not any more represented in the Serbian parliament – the temporary legislative of the province of Kosovo.
The method, which Ragin proposes for the identification of those paths, is a systematic investigation of the causal paths and a simplification of the multiple causal explanations, using Boolean algebra. By the means of this method ("Qualitative Comparative Analysis", short QCA), one or several conditions or combinations of conditions may be identified, which explain the outcome for the investigated cases.

The method borrows the formal language from Boolean algebra. Every variable is identified with a letter or a combination of letters. Variables usually are binary, and capital letters symbolise the presence of a phenomena, while lower-case letters stand for the absence of it. To explain the notation, I use two variables as examples: “CONC” symbolises that an ethnic minority lives concentrated on a small geographic territory, whereas “conc” means that it does not – and that it lives spread through the country; “NAT_CONST” stands for electoral systems with national thresholds (nationalisation constraints), whereas “nat_const” for those without. If a variable has three or more classes of values, those are numerated, and indicated in brackets: For instance, for the ordinal scaled variable “SIZE”, there are three the three categories “SIZE {0}” (small), “SIZE {1}” (medium-sized) or “SIZE {2}” (large) (all my variables are explained below).

Further, Boolean algebra uses both signs + (addition) and * (multiplication). The addition sign (+) stands for the logical “or”, while the multiplication sign (*) means a logical “and”. The notation “CONC + nat_const” hence means that an ethnic minority lives concentrated or that the country’s electoral system does not provide nationalisation constraints. Or, in other words, at least one of two conditions applies. The notation “CONC * nat_const” however would mean that both conditions apply, or, that an ethnic group lives concentrated and that there are no nationalisation constraints in the electoral system.

The conjunctural terms count up to three or four variables in the hypotheses that I want to test in my study. In addition, some independent variables in the conjunctural terms are theoretically and empirically interdependent on each other, implying high levels of multicollinearity and making analyses by regression models problematic. The case thus appears ideal to apply Qualitative Comparative Analysis. However, I have to do with the method’s limits.

- Firstly, the method has been developed for the analyses of a small number of cases (up to 50) – while my database counts more than 100 cases to investigate.
- The method follows a deterministic concept, where for every combination a specific outcome may be expected. In social systems, however, it is almost impossible to exactly explain a certain outcome – that is why usually probabilistic methods are used to test explanatory models.

This is why I will test the conjunctural terms of variables that are favourable to ethnic minority parties in my analysis. However, I expect that there will be some cases where, in spite of favourable conditions for ethnic minority parties, no such parties were formed. This allows me to have so called “contradictory classes” in my analysis: Groups of identical conditions (with an identical configuration of independent variables) where outcomes are different. These classes are integrated in the analysis model in the same way as positive outcomes – and analysed particularly as a second step.
Cases and dependent variable (outcome)
Every ethnic minority in each of the investigated countries is coded as one case.\(^6\)
The dependent variable is operationalised through a binary variable “PARTY”, which measures whether a political party which represents an ethnic minority exists in parliament and whether it competed with an own electoral list. (The variable is based on the results from the most recent national elections, as of 2005.) Both Russia and Ukraine were excluded from the analysis, because both parliaments count a very large number of independent candidates whose ethnic affiliation is not identifiable.\(^7\)
It may possibly appear problematic to consider only parties, which competed with an own list in elections. Sometimes ethnic minority parties may compete as part of electoral alliances. However, these parties do not have full independence.\(^8\)

Independent variables
One set of independent variables concerns the ethnic minority population. A second set of independent variables concerns features of electoral system.
First, I describe independent variables regarding the population.
- With the variable “SIZE”, I measure the share of an ethnic minority group in the total country population, according to national population censuses or other sources\(^9\) (see appendix B); most recent data found was used. For the purpose of the QCA analysis, the variable has to be categorised. Ethnic minorities with a population share of less than 0,4% are considered small; minorities with a population share of 0,4%-8% as middle-sized, and those with more than 8% as large.\(^10\)
- The regional concentration of the population group is measured with the variable “CONC”. My hypotheses suggest that for SMD electoral systems, it is crucial if a national ethnic minority is a local majority in at least one electoral district. For PR district systems on the other hand, it is important that most of the ethnic minority population is concentrated in one or few districts

\(^6\) An alternative way would have been to choose each of the countries as one case. However, this would create problems for the analysis, as neither the independent variables (structure of the ethnic groups, sometimes even the electoral system) nor the dependent variables (existence of an ethnic minority party) are homogeneous for all the ethnic minorities in one country.
\(^7\) The difficulty of identification of the ethnic minority deputies in the Russian “Duma” and the Ukrainian “Verhovna Rada” is illustrated by Moser (2005), who investigates the question with a proper research project in progress.
\(^8\) First, focusing on the party itself: A party, which runs on a joint electoral list, does not have the same autonomy, when retiring members of parliament have to be replaced. It is then dependent on the goodwill of the other parties on the joint electoral list. Further, an important principle of democratic regimes is regular re-elections, as they constrain political parties to behave according their election promises and the will of their electorate (if they want to be re-elected). Second, focusing on the voters’ choice: If several political parties’ candidates appear on joint electoral lists, the voters do not have a choice which of parties they want to vote. Instead, they vote for a party alliance, even if some of the allied parties may have opposing programs and the voter’s perception of the member parties varies between the parties.
\(^9\) In some countries, census data on ethnicity are not available, not easily accessible, reported to be unreliable (particularly Roma tend to be underreported in census data) or ethnicity did not figure in the questionnaire. In some of the cases, however, the reported mother tongue or religion is very closely linked to the ethnicity (for instance for ethnic minorities from former Yugoslavia in Slovenia). Hence, those data could be used in order to estimate the population share of the ethnic minority.
\(^10\) In perfectly proportional representation systems with about 200-250 parliament seats, the lower range corresponds approximately to the lowest threshold for parliamentary representation. The upper margin at 8% may be related to legal electoral thresholds, which are typically about 4-5% of the national vote. However, often suffrage is less spread amongst ethnic minorities and turnouts may be lower; furthermore some members of ethnic minorities vote as well for mixed-ethnic parties. Those factors may reduce the potential of ethnic minority parties. Consequently, only large minorities with over 8% of the votes are likely to meet the threshold. Hence, I set the limit above the typical threshold.
but no majority is necessary). However, the quality of the available data does not permit this distinction (and existing databases on ethnic minorities contain information only on a small part of my cases, cf. Gurr et al. 2005). The variable CONC is coded positively if an overwhelming majority of the ethnic minority group lives in a small part of the country.

A second series of variables concerns the applied electoral laws of the countries.

- The variable “PR” distinguishes proportional electoral systems from mixed electoral systems. PR systems are coded 1; countries with mixed electoral systems are coded 0 (Albania, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine). In mixed systems, one stage of the parliamentary seats is accorded through proportional elections and a second stage through SMD elections. Pure SMD systems no longer exist for the election of first national legislative chambers in the region.
- Some electoral laws provide national electoral thresholds (“nationalisation constraints”). The variable “NAT_CONST” codes all countries where a threshold of at least 3% of the nationwide votes is applied for proportional elections. (In mixed electoral systems, these thresholds apply only for the proportional part of the elections.) Some countries do not apply these thresholds to ethnic minority parties. In those cases, the variable is coded 0.
- A number of countries in the region provide a numerous electoral districts that are not territorially, but ethnically based. This means that members of an ethnic minorities, namely in Croatia, Kosovo and Slovenia, elect their parliamentary representatives special constituencies. My variable “SPECIAL” is coded 1 for those ethnic minorities that vote in special ethnic constituencies. Where several ethnic minorities compete for the same parliamentary mandate, the variable is coded 1 only for the largest ethnic group in each constituency.
- Finally, Albania and Bulgaria forbid the competition of ethnically based parties by constitutional law. However, Bulgaria does not apply this legislation to the party of the Turkish minority. In Albania, the Greek minority party (Unity for Human Rights Party) is tolerated because it does not officially appear as an ethnic minority party (Cesid 2002: 59; European Forum 2005). For ethnic minorities that are not allowed to form parties by national law, my final variable (“BAN”) is coded 1.

Formalisation of my hypotheses
Based on these variables, I may formalise my hypothesis in the following equation. Altogether, there are four different paths by which ethnic minority parties may exist. The lack of a ban on ethnic minority parties is a common condition for all of them; hence it is necessary in general.

\[
\text{PARTY} = \text{ban} \times (\text{SPECIAL} + \text{SIZE} \{2\} \times \text{PR} + \text{SIZE} \{1;2\} \times \text{CONC} \times \text{nat CONST} \times \text{PR} + \text{CONC} \times \text{PR})
\]  
(formula 1)
2.5. Empirical analysis

As a first step, the empirical cases analysed (after exclusion of incomplete data on Russia and Ukraine, my database counts 106 ethnic minority groups overall) are classified according to the independent variables. Altogether, I count 26 groups of cases that each represents a combination of my independent variables. 8 of these groups of cases are coded positively, they lead to a positive outcome for all the investigated cases (existence of an ethnic minority party); 13 groups are coded negatively (no ethnic minority parties). The remaining 5 groups lead to contradictory results: ethnic minority parties exist only in some of the cases, in other cases, they do not (table 2). However, this fits with the tested hypothesis: In my study, I try to explain which electoral systems allow ethnic minority parties to exist – and which do not. Hence, as the first step, I include all the positive groups of cases with positive or contradictory outcome (cf. Ragin 1987).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Electoral law</th>
<th>Dependent Outcome</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group</td>
<td>Concentrated Ban</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Nat' Constraints</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 &gt;5% yes no yes no yes RO-HU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 &gt;5% no no no no yes BH-SE, BH-BG</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 0.4%-8% yes no yes no yes CG-SL, SLO-HU, KO-TU, KO-BG, KO-SE, RO-UK, RO-GE</td>
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<td>4 0.4%-8% yes no yes no yes HR-HU, HR-SE</td>
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<td>5 0.4%-8% yes no mixed no yes yes AL-GR</td>
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<td>6 0.4%-8% no no yes yes yes RO-RO, RO-RO</td>
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<td>7 0.4%-8% no no yes yes yes HR-MU</td>
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<td>8 &lt;0.4% yes no yes no yes SLO, IT, KO-GO, KO-TU, RO-TA, RO-SK, RO-SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 ≥8% yes no yes yes no yes AR-HA, ES-RI*, MA-AL</td>
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<td>10 ≥8% yes no PR yes no yes SK-HU, CZE-CZ</td>
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<td>11 ≥8% no no yes no yes CG-SL, SLO-BO, SLO-BE, AL-GE</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 0.4%-8% yes no no yes no LI-UK, LI-RO, LI-PO, HU-GL, HU-SE, HU-RO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 0.4%-8% yes no mixed yes no C-RO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 ≥8% yes no mixed yes no no LI-RU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 0.4%-8% yes yes yes yes no no MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 0.4%-8% yes yes mixed no no AL-MA, AL-MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 0.4%-8% yes no PR yes no no AL-MA, AL-MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 0.4%-8% no yes PR yes no no MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 0.4%-8% no yes mixed no no AL-MA, AL-MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 0.4%-8% no no PR yes no no AL-MA, AL-MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 0.4%-8% no no no no no AL-MA, AL-MA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22 0.4%-8% no no no yes yes MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 &lt;0.4% yes no yes no no MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 &lt;0.4% no no no yes yes MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25 &lt;0.4% no no yes no no MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 &lt;0.4% no no yes no no MA-MA*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: QCA "Truth Table", variables determining the electoral success of ethnic minority parties (Outcome). 106 ethnic minority groups are arranged in 26 groups according the independent variables.

Outcome: yes = existence of a parliamentary ethnic party (cases in italic); no = non-existence; C = contradictory cases
* CG-SE; BG-MA; SE-BO; MA-RO: Ethnic parties exist in parliament, but were elected on common electoral lists with ethnic majority parties.
* ES-RU: The ethnic minority competed with different lists.
However, in order to get more understandable results, I simplify the terms, building groups of categories where the representation of ethnic minority parties is possible. My analysis with the use of Boolean algebra and including so-called “logical cases” identifies four “paths” which describe configurations where ethnic minorities may get parliamentary representation.\footnote{The analysis is carried out with the QCA software Tosmana. This software allows finding parsimonious terms. I merge both positive and contradictory outcomes as both indicate that there is a possibility for ethnic minorities to be represented with own parties, even if this opportunity is not used in all the investigated cases. Further, so-called “logical cases” are included in the simplification. They regard configurations that were not observed in the empirical examples, but that differ only minimally from them and that help to simplify the explanation terms.}

\begin{align*}
\text{PARTY} &= \text{SPECIAL} \\
&\quad + \text{SIZE} \{2\} \ast \text{PR} \\
&\quad + \text{ban} \ast \text{CONC} \ast \text{nat\_const} \ast \text{SIZE} \{1\} \\
&\quad + \text{ban} \ast \text{CONC} \ast \text{pr} \ast \text{size} \{0;1\}
\end{align*}

(formula 2)

This formula almost corresponds with my formulated hypothesis. Indeed, I observe the four paths that I predicted in the outcomes. However, for some of the paths there are tiny differences regarding the relevant variables. Most may be explained with the absence of appropriate cases in the sample, in combination with the analysis method.\footnote{First, there is theoretically a strong negative collinearity of the variables \text{BAN} and \text{SPECIAL}. Thus, if a national legislation provides special constituencies for ethnic minority in order to protect it, is very unlikely that the same legislation bans ethnic minority parties. And there is apparently a strong negative empirical collinearity of proportional representation in combination with large ethnic groups and bans on ethnic minority parties. Consequently, in the first two paths of the resulting formula, there are no cases where ethnic parties are banned. And due to the treatment of logical cases, the variable "ban" dropped out of the formula. Second, empirical cases with large ethnic minorities (\text{SIZE} \{2\}) are rare in the sample. The special case of the Russian minority in Lithuania and the absence of any cases with the configuration "\text{ban} \ast \text{CONC} \ast \text{nat\_const} \ast \text{SIZE} \{2\}" may have lead to the result that \text{SIZE} \{2\} cases are excluded in the third and fourth part – contradicting the hypotheses; cf. hypotheses test.}

Actually, there is only one case configuration for which I predicted a positive outcome but which appears negative: the Russian minority in Lithuania (group 14 in table 2). This group, making up 8,2\% of the population (according to Alesina et al. 2003; according to census data 6,3\%), could meet the electoral threshold of 5\% in the proportional part of the election (there is no information available to the author if ethnic Russians hold an absolute population majority in one of the 71 single-member districts). But even if there is no ethnically defined Russian party, the Russian-led (but mixed-ethnic) Labour party had success in the 2004 parliamentary elections, and in former elections, Russian parties formed coalitions with non-ethnically defined parties (cf. Fitzmaurice 2003; Jurkynas 2005: 775f.).

Particular attention should be given to the contradictory cases, which are listed in the case groups 9-13.

- Group 9: While Croats in Bosnia and Albanians in Macedonia are represented in their own parties, Russian parties in Estonia are not represented in parliament. This may be a consequence of the competition among several Russian parties. Each of them failed to meet the district thresholds.

- Group 10: The Hungarian minority in Slovakia formed its own party. This is not the case for the Moravians in the Czech Republic, as the ethnic issue is not heavily politicised there.
- Group 11: The example of Bulgarian Turks and Latvian Russians show that indeed it is possible to form ethnic minority parties in the given circumstances. In Montenegro however, the Serbian minority parties joined an electoral coalition with mixed-ethnic parties supporting a similar policy.\(^{13}\) Similarly, the Russian and Ukrainian minority cultural policy interests in Moldavia are represented through the governing, mixed-ethnic party (cf. Lunestad 2001: 8).

- Group 12: While the German minority in Poland formed own parliamentary parties, there was no such attempt from several ethnic minorities in Slovenia, even if the conditions are similar.\(^{14}\)

- Group 13: Under mixed electoral systems with nationalisation constraints in the PR stage, representation is possible for concentrated ethnic minority groups, but difficult. The ethnic group has to have local majorities in the electoral districts and is still likely to be under-represented in parliament. This may be a reason why out of the six cases in this case group, only the Polish minority in Lithuania formed its own party. Further, the quality of the data used does not allow us to decide if the investigated ethnic minorities are concentrated enough to succeed in single-member district elections.

The Lithuanian case and, likewise, the contradictory configurations correspond with the character of my hypotheses. There are many reasons to justify why not every ethnic minority group forms an ethnically defined party. Some ethnic minorities are well-integrated and, politically, their members orient themselves on issues rather than on ethnic ground (this may be particularly salient if the second aspect – the possibility of forming different ethnic minority parties – is not respected, see discussion below). Or, governing parties may already pursue a policy, which reflects ethnic minorities requests (Moldavian case). Another possibility is that ethnic minorities are not organised enough to succeed in elections or run with too many parties.\(^{15}\)

Very similar results to those with the QCA approach are produced when testing my model with a binary logit regression. They are reported in Appendix A, where, furthermore, both methods are compared.

2.6. When may ethnic minority parties exist?
The results suggest that the existence of ethnic minority parties does not only depend on the size and territorial structure of an ethnic minority, but that electoral laws have an important impact. While in some countries tiny minorities of just tenths of percents hold parliamentary seats, other electoral laws hinder large ethnic minorities – in some cases almost 10% of the total population (like for instance the Russian minority of Lithuania) – of being represented in parliament.

Which electoral system is appropriate depends on the size of ethnic minorities:

\(^{13}\) The main issue in Montenegro’s politics, separatism versus loyalty to the federation with Serbia, is not only defined through ethnic lines. Rather, one part of the Montenegrin ethnic majority is likewise with the Serbian minority opposed to Montenegro’s separatism.

\(^{14}\) Reasons are not known to the author. Plausible explanations could be either not-politicised ethnic lines or lacking citizenship of a part of the ethnic minority groups in question.

\(^{15}\) Further, some electoral systems (without empirical example in the region) may enable representation of ethnic minorities to form own parties, but under special circumstances not be favourable to them, and thus drive minorities to join mixed-ethnic parties; cf. section 4.
Large ethnic minorities may be represented through every kind of proportional representation, through special districts, or — if they live concentrated — through mixed electoral systems (however there are no empirical cases which confirm this last configuration).

Medium-sized ethnic minorities do best with PR without nationalisation constraints or with systems with special districts. If the minorities live concentrated, they may be represented through a mixed electoral system as well.

Small ethnic minorities only get representation in parliament through electoral systems with special districts or through mixed electoral systems if they are very concentrated (however there is no empirical evidence for the last configuration).

Especially for geographically non-concentrated minorities, representation in parliament is often difficult to achieve or even impossible. Either they have to be large, or they need special electoral districts. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, this is an important reason for the non-representation of Roma and Ashkali in parliament. Besides — or, rather, in combination with — lacking political mobilisation and organisation (Sobotka 2001), electoral laws appear as a major reason why this ethnic minority is denied representation in most parliaments of the region. Indeed, Roma or Ashkali parties only succeed in Kosovo and Romania. Both countries apply special electoral rules for ethnic minorities, either special PR constituencies (Kosovo) or exceptions from the national threshold and reserved ethnic minority seats (Romania).

Further, the results show that national thresholds, when applied without special rules for ethnic minorities or with mixed electoral systems, are a means to exclude their parties from parliament. However, the electoral rules alone are not enough to explain entirely the formation of ethnic minority parties — they may rather be seen as a necessary condition. They rather create more or less favourable circumstances for ethnic party creation.

3. Electoral systems and party plurality (2\textsuperscript{nd} aspect)

The second aspect regards if ethnic minorities can be represented by several political parties (in those cases where the second-largest party of the ethnic minority counts for at least the vote share of one seat in parliament).

In this section, I shall discuss why plurality amongst ethnic minority parties may be important, which electoral laws allow plurality amongst ethnic minority parties, and illustrate this with empirical cases from Central and Eastern Europe.

3.1. The importance of party plurality amongst ethnic minorities

For the ethnic majority such a plurality of political opinions and actors is considered as one of the most elementary principle of democracy. Nevertheless, some electoral systems may deny intra-ethnic party competition because they hinder the creation of several parties that represent the same ethnic minority.

Party plurality allows ethnic minorities to represent different, maybe distinct interests inside the ethnic minority group. First, a country’s cleavage system may not only rest on ethnic cleavages, and consequently ethnic minority voters may not be interested to vote for a unitary ethnic minority party. Second, ethnic minority voters often have different positions regarding the ethnic cleavage.
Some may prefer radical solutions (ethnic separatism), other moderate and bargained options, like strengthen autonomy (cf. Horowitz 1985: 349f.). The latter are important to the central state because moderate groups make bargaining with ethnic minorities much easier. When however ethnic minority representation rests on only one party, possibly only the radical (and often larger) group will gain political power, or, in the best cases, this may lead to a system of changing representation of both ethnic minority forces. However, for long-term bargained solutions, it is a crucial advantage to be sure of a moderate bargaining partner that remains in power for a long period.

However, the test of this aspect is restricted by the number of seats in the legislative chamber and the size of the ethnic minority.16

3.2. Classifying the expected effects of electoral systems

Electoral laws may favour or prevent such political plurality amongst the ethnic minority:

- SMD systems allow only groups who hold a majority of votes in the single districts to be represented. Consequently, national ethnic minorities who form local majorities (more than 50% of the votes in one or more districts) may be represented in parliament (cf. section 2). However, party plurality is only possible if the local majority of national ethnic minorities is overwhelming, for instance if a national ethnic minority counts more than two thirds of the local voters. Otherwise, party competition among ethnic minorities (local majorities) would carry the danger of losing the district concerned to the ethnic majority: If for instance only 55% of the local voters make part of the national ethnic minority (and vote for its parties), they may not split their vote on several parties, because otherwise they risk to lose the district to the national ethnic majority, which holds up to 45% of votes. Hence, SMD allows party plurality only in cases with an extraordinarily high concentration of the national ethnic minority.

- PR with electoral districts allows concentrated or large ethnic minorities to be represented in parliament. There are no particular thresholds against a plurality ethnic minority parties.

- PR with national legal thresholds (“nationalisation constraints”) do not contain any direct constraints against a plurality of ethnic minority parties. Every single party has to meet the national threshold. Hence, the second largest ethnic minority party has to get a larger percentage of votes than the national threshold counts, which is unlikely. In many cases, ethnic minority party competition could rather put in difficulties the largest ethnic minority party, which could fail to meet the threshold.

- Most of the special electoral rules for ethnic minorities hinder party plurality amongst them. Where ethnic minority deputies are elected in special districts with majority rules (Croatia, Slovenia), even in multi-member districts a party monopole is likely to result (Taagepera/Shugart 1989). If PR rules apply in the special districts (Kosovo, Montenegro), party plurality should be possible.17

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16 The population share of small ethnic groups may not exceed the vote share that is necessary to win one single parliamentary seat. In those cases, the plurality criterion could only be translated into practice if the ethnic minority would be over-represented in parliament. Latter may be desired in specific cases, but is disputable as a general rule with regards to principles of democratic representation. Hence, the plurality criterion is reduced to those cases where there is more than one political party that surpasses the threshold that is given through the parliament size.

17 The situation in Romania is different: The country reserves 18 seats for ethnic minorities, they are not elected in special districts, but in the countrywide PR vote and they figure on the same ballot. One party from each ethnic group is
In sum, we may expect several ethnic minority parties in three cases:
- The ethnic minority is large and a PR system without national threshold is applied. (1)
- The ethnic minority is very concentrated and large and a mixed electoral system is applied. (2)
- Special electoral districts for ethnic minorities exist; elections are hold by PR. (3)

3.3. Empirical test

Statistically significant empirical tests of those hypotheses for Central and Eastern Europe are not possible, because indeed, there are only very few ethnic minorities in the region which are represented by several ethnic minority parties. I shall try to classify the cases according to my hypotheses and check for exceptions from my hypotheses.

The test was carried out using the Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA). As all the information about the cases was already given in the analysis in the previous section and the hypotheses are similar, only a summary of the results is reported.

If regarding the independent variables, and referring to the analysis in section 2 (cf. table 2 above), we may identify the following groups, which correspond to the formulated hypotheses:

1. Large ethnic minorities and PR systems without threshold appear in the groups 1, 2 and 9, which comprise all the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Macedonia, Russians in Estonia and Hungarians in Romania.
2. Large ethnic minorities, who live concentrated in countries with mixed electoral systems correspond to the group 14, as it is the case of the Russian minority in Lithuania.
3. Special electoral districts with PR rules appear for the Serbian, Roma, Bosniak and Turkish ethnic minorities in Kosovo and for the Albanian minority in Montenegro (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration (hypotheses)</th>
<th>Empirical cases with party plurality among ethnic minority (+)</th>
<th>Empirical cases without party plurality among ethnic minority (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) PR without threshold, large ethnic group (hypothesis: plurality)</td>
<td>BiH-HR; BiH-SE; BiH-BO; MA-AL (4)</td>
<td>ES-RU, RO-HU (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Mixed system, large ethnic group (hypothesis: plurality)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>LI-RU (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Special districts, PR (hypothesis: plurality)</td>
<td>KO-BO; KO-SE; KO-RO; (CG-AL) (4)</td>
<td>KO-TU (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other electoral systems (hypothesis: no party plurality)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>All other ethnic minorities (95)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Electoral systems and ethnic group population structure (column left; cf. hypotheses) and existence of several ethnic parties. Classification of 106 cases (ethnic minorities) from Central and Eastern Europe.

Empirical evidence supports the first and the third hypotheses. There are only few exceptions from the rule, regarding Russian parties in Estonia (ES-RU; which did not manage to meet the natural threshold, given to the limited district size), Hungarians in Romania (RO-HU, who run with a united party) and Turks in Kosovo (KO-TU; who have 2 guaranteed seats, accorded by PR, but only one excluded from the requirement to meet the legal 5% threshold and may get one of 18 ethnic minority seats. But party plurality is excluded.
party stood for elections). Albanians in Montenegro (CG-AL) are a special case, because the law (PR in a special 2-member district) would allow party competition, but indeed, both Albanian parties agreed an electoral alliance (OSCE 2002: 8).

The second hypothesis however could not be empirically confirmed. This result might be explained by the fact that the concentration variable may not be sufficiently precisely measured.\textsuperscript{18}

To sum up, the results show that PR is a very valuable institution to allow a plurality of ethnic minority parties. However, party plurality is further linked to large ethnic groups and the absence of national legal thresholds or to special constituencies with PR electoral rules.

4. Electoral systems and mixed-ethnic parties (3\textsuperscript{rd} aspect)

\textbf{Thirdly, electoral systems should allow – or better encourage – mixed-ethnic parties.}

Even if the possibility for the formation of ethnic minority parties (1\textsuperscript{st} aspect) is of crucial importance, the creation of inter-ethnic parties is told to be more favourable for the integration of ethnic groups: As they have to attract voters from different ethnicities, they take moderate policy positions and avoid zero-sum-games in favour of one ethnic group – and at the expense of the others. Like authors from the integrative school argue (cf. Reilly 2001), several electoral system elements (to be discussed below) favour such inter-ethnic parties by giving systematic advantages to moderate parties. Some other electoral systems, however, may create particular obstacles to the creation for inter-ethnic parties.

In this section, both negative and positive incentives for mixed-ethnic parties shall be discussed.

Positive incentives are said to be possible through preferential voting systems, where voters do not only cast votes for the most preferred parties, but as well for less-ranked preferences. Mixed-ethnic parties may profit from those votes because they may be valuable second-best options for many voters. Negative incentives are of indirect nature: Some electoral rules over-weight votes of ethnic minority voters, or they favour parties of the ethnic minorities. Hence, if the advantages are linked to ethnic minority parties, there are incentives not to vote for mixed-ethnic parties.

4.1. Negative incentives for mixed-ethnic parties

Voting for mixed-ethnic parties may be little advantageous, because incentives work for mono-ethnic parties.

First, incentives in favour of ethnic minority voters are listed, in order to discuss their consequences on the election of mixed-ethnic parties. Positive discrimination of minorities may help to achieve ethnic conciliation. Electoral laws offer several ways of discriminating minorities positively:

- Weighting the votes of members of ethnic minorities more than the votes of members of the ethnic majorities. Typically, this is possible through over-weighting districts where ethnic minorities vote in the seat distributions, or indirectly through ethnic gerrymandering.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} The Russians in Lithuania appear to be the only large ethnic minority group that live concentrated in a country with a mixed electoral system. However, they do not live concentrated enough. According to the Census 2001 data, they do not count a majority neither in any of the 10 Lithuanian counties, nor in any of the 56 towns and regions. Other large ethnic minorities which live concentrated in countries with mixed electoral systems do not exist in the region.

\textsuperscript{19}
- Favouring ethnic minority parties regarding registration for election or liberating them from legal threshold requirements.
- According bonus seats to ethnic minority parties.

Implications of these measures for the vote for mixed-ethnic parties are discussed in table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive discrimination measure</th>
<th>Voting for <strong>ethnic minority parties</strong></th>
<th>Voting for <strong>mixed-ethnic parties</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overweighing ethnic minority voters.</td>
<td>If ethnic minorities vote for ethnic minority parties, they will be over-represented.</td>
<td>If ethnic minorities vote for mixed-ethnic parties, they will be over-represented. <strong>Neither negative nor positive incentives</strong> (compared to ethnic minority parties).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced thresholds or easier registration for ethnic minority parties.</td>
<td>Enables that small ethnic minority parties compete – and thus possibly enables voters to vote for ethnic minority parties.</td>
<td>No effect. There are <strong>no incentives</strong> for the one or other party, as the vote weights the same if going to the one or the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus seats for ethnic minority parties.</td>
<td>Incentive to vote for ethnic minority parties, as in that case, the vote will count more (vote will be awarded a bonus).</td>
<td>No similar incentives for mixed-ethnic parties; hence, the relative attractiveness of mono-ethnic parties is increased. Mixed-ethnic parties are put at a <strong>disadvantage</strong>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Positive discrimination measures and their incentives to vote for mixed-ethnic parties. (Hypotheses)

Two of the discussed measures of positive discrimination have no expected influence on mixed-ethnic parties (table 4). Only where bonus seats are accorded to ethnic minority parties, are mixed-ethnic parties at a competitive disadvantage. From the investigated Central and Eastern European countries, this is the case only for Romania.

Further, under majoritarian rules, if the ethnic conflict is salient, mixed-ethnic parties may be difficultly elected, because they hardly gain a majority of voters. This applies to both forms of majoritarian districts: Single-member districts as national electoral system or majoritarian elections in special ethnic minority constituencies. However, majoritarian rules do not necessarily put mixed-ethnic parties in disadvantage; this is only the case if voters tend to vote for mono-ethnic parties.

4.2. Positive incentives for mixed-ethnic parties

Preferential voting systems should be discussed at this place, as they are very frequently considered to be the only electoral systems that have a conciliation effect – or in line with the question of this section, bring incentives for mixed-ethnic parties. A test on the cases treated in

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19 Ethnic gerrymandering: In SMD systems, constituency borders may be drawn in a way that ethnic minority deputies get over-represented or under-represented in parliament, even if the votes of members of ethnic minorities are not visibly weighted (for examples from the USA and Malaysia: Issacharoff 2002: 596f.; Brown 2005: 434).
this paper however is not possible, as they were not applied to national parliament elections in Central and Eastern Europe.\(^{20}\)

The idea behind the conciliation effect may be explained with a game theoretical model: Two ethnic groups have opposite, incompatible interests. Or, in other words, we have a conflict on a single dimension with typical zero-sum-solutions. Each opposed ethnic group would like the conflict to be resolved in its own direction, which would be the least-liked solution for the opposed group. A compromise would be more desirable. But as long as both opposed conflict groups fight for their own interests, such a compromise may hardly be reached. Both ethnic groups think of ameliorating their own position if opting for extreme solutions instead of compromise. Additionally, an extreme policy of one group enforces extreme policies of the opposed group.

Consequently, when a political system is dominated by an inter-ethnic conflict and voters elect amongst ethnic lines, centrifugal forces are empowered. Mixed-ethnic parties would lead to better solutions (conciliation; compromise), but they score badly in elections, when ethnicity is an important element of the voting decision (cf. Horowitz 1985: 344ff.).

The integrative school of electoral systems praises ordinal voting systems or preferential voting. In preferential voting systems, voters do not only vote for their most favourite party, but rank several favourite parties or even all parties on their ballot. Hence, they do not only vote for their own ethnic party, but will give second-order votes to mixed-ethnic parties. Those lower-order votes get effective, when the most preferred party drops out of the electoral race.\(^{21}\)

This is why preferential voting systems are proposed as conciliating solution in cases of ethnic conflicts. There are different types of preferential voting systems – best-known are the Alternative Vote, which is a special kind of majority voting systems, and Single Transferable Vote (STV), a proportional representation system (Farrell 2001; Reynolds/Reilly 2002).

However, the theoretically expected success of moderate or mixed-ethnic parties relies heavily on the population structure and the political preferences of the electors in the districts. The Alternative Vote (AV) may support mixed-ethnic or moderate parties under certain conditions:

As AV is a member of the family of majoritarian electoral systems, it will always lead to the election of ethnically defined party, if an absolute majority of voters in a constituency (means on the local level) belongs to the same ethnic group and votes for its mono-ethnic party. In those cases, the ethnic minority rests un-represented, and mixed-ethnic parties have no chance.

\(^{20}\) There was only one case in national legislative elections: 1990 Estonia used the Single Transferable Vote system. But – as will be explained in the following considerations – this type of preferential system brings only very small incentives for mixed-ethnic parties.

The electoral system that is much more frequently considered for the purpose of ethnic conciliation is the Alternative Vote system. Some authors of the "integrative school" even mention only the Alternative Vote system (see particularly Reilly 2001). However, it was never used in Central and Eastern Europe.

In Slovenia, for the election of the ethnic minority candidates in the two special ethnic minority districts, a Borda count system is used, which is as well a form of preferential voting and which is said to have similar consequences as the Alternative Vote. As those elections are hold only within each ethnic group, there are no incentives through this system for mixed-ethnic parties. In the so-called “Republika Srpska”, the Serbian-governed federal entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alternative Vote was applied for presidential elections.

\(^{21}\) Or, in STV systems, when a candidate surpasses the necessary amount of votes to get elected, the remaining votes are transferred to the next-ordered candidates on the ballots.
For salient ethnic cleavages\textsuperscript{22}, we may expect two different types of voter’s preferential orders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences</th>
<th>“Ethnic party voter”</th>
<th>“Conciliation voter”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Parties of own ethnicity</td>
<td>Mixed ethnic parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mixed ethnic parties</td>
<td>Parties of own ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Parties of other ethnicities</td>
<td>Parties of other ethnicities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following this model, if the “ethnic party voters” of one single ethnic group cover an absolute majority of voters, their own ethnic parties will be elected.

Which are the conditions for AV leading to the goal, i.e. to the election of mixed-ethnic parties?

- First, I treat cases where there is an ethnic majority and one or several ethnic minorities in the constituency. For the desired election of mixed ethnic parties, ethnic minority voters and ethnic majority “conciliation voters” together have to compound an absolute majority.
- In a second group of cases, no ethnic group is majoritarian, and all the ethnic boundaries are salient. In those cases, Alternative Vote always leads to the election of mixed ethnic parties.

In sum, the desired effect of AV is linked to very strong conditions that presumably are rarely fulfilled. If not, the consequences may be seriously negative: Majoritarian voting systems lead to the exclusion of (local) ethnic minorities from representation.\textsuperscript{23}

For STV, the conditions for the mixed-ethnic party incentives may be much less strong: As it makes part of the PR family, no absolute majority, but only effective thresholds (given through the district size) apply. However, the incentives ought be much smaller.

My model suggests, that the effect of preferential systems heavily depends on the population structure. Empirical testing of these hypotheses on the cases under study (Central and Eastern Europe) is not possible, as the system was never applied in these countries. However, voting patterns under preferential voting systems and of their effect should be subjected to further research.

5. Conclusion

As has been shown from a theoretical and empirical point of view, the process of ethnic minority representation in parliament heavily depends on the electoral institutions. In this paper, I attended to test the common electoral systems with regards to three main aspects of ethnic minority representation. The impact of the same electoral rules may be ambiguous, allowing the representation of ethnic minority parties (1\textsuperscript{st} aspect), but under-representing them, or preventing political plurality among ethnic minorities (2\textsuperscript{nd} aspect) or putting mixed-ethnic parties at a disadvantage (3\textsuperscript{rd} aspect).

The results are difficult to generalise. Depending on the voters’ configuration and the population structure of a country, similar rules may lead to very different outcomes. Plurality or majority rules for instance may allow effective gerrymandering in favour of concentrated ethnic minorities, but

\textsuperscript{22} This pattern may be changed, if other cleavages get more important than the ethnic cleavage. Otherwise – if the ethnic cleavage is dominant – we may suppose that every voter prefers parties that represent the own ethnic group over such that represent exclusively other ethnic groups.

\textsuperscript{23} For a similar critic on AV, see Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) with a hypothetic model based on the 1999 elections in Fiji.
often exclude disperse minorities from representation. Majoritarian electoral systems like the Alternative Vote may in special cases in some districts incite the election of a mixed-ethnic party. In other districts the same electoral system may be a motor of the election of the ethnic majority parties and hence of exclusion of ethnic minorities. This is why this paper does not contain any general advice about particularly desirable electoral rules. Instead, to conclude, the important electoral systems are listed, and conclusions regarding the three aspects are presented in a systematic matter in an overview table (table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation PR)</td>
<td>Possible. National legal thresholds limit representation to large ethnic minorities. However, (recognised) ethnic minorities may be excluded from the threshold requirement.</td>
<td>Possible.</td>
<td>No incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small constituencies or Single Transferable Vote (STV) limit representation to large or geographically concentrated ethnic minorities. Bonus seats for ethnic minority parties may remove obstacles.</td>
<td>STV may lead to tiny positive incentives, but conditions apply (cf. section 4).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality or majority voting systems (SMD) (incl. Alternative Vote)</td>
<td>Possible, if ethnic minorities are very concentrated (local majorities). May lead to over-representation, but carries the risk of under-representation. Allows ethnic gerrymandering (tactical under- or over-representation of ethnic minorities through the drawing of constituency boundaries.)</td>
<td>Difficult; requires that ethnic minorities are an overwhelming majority at the local level.</td>
<td>Negative incentive. The vote of a voter counts more if she or he votes for an ethnic minority party than for a mixed-ethnic party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed electoral systems (SMD and nationwide PR with threshold)</td>
<td>Possible, if ethnic minorities are very concentrated or large. If not both conditions are met, ethnic minorities will not have the chance to get elected.</td>
<td>For the PR seats possible, for the SMD seats only under particular circumstances.</td>
<td>No incentives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bochsler, Daniel (2006): Electoral engineering and inclusion of ethnic groups

Table 5: Electoral systems and their impacts for the representation of ethnic minorities, according three aspects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particular electoral rules for ethnic minorities</th>
<th>Possible.</th>
<th>Possible, if an ethnic minority holds more than one seat and PR is used or if there are several single-member districts.</th>
<th>Difficult.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special constitencies for ethnic minorities.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Incentives for mixed-ethnic parties. But mixed-ethnic parties do not have to adopt ethnic minority demands, as they have no alternative than voting for mixed-ethnic parties.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on ethnic minority parties.</td>
<td>Impossible.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding representation of ethnic minority parties, my hypotheses were tested in a systematic matter on the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Results show that the hypotheses are confirmed to a very high degree. My analysis distinguished four configurations in which ethnic minorities may get represented. However, electoral rules alone may not explain entirely when ethnic minority parties succeed in elections and when they do not. They rather favour or hinder ethnic minority parties of becoming representation in parliament.

Like hypothesised and showed in the empirical analysis, electoral rules that have been proved to be successful for distinct ethnic minorities may have opposite effect in other cases.

From the investigated countries and provinces, Kosovo’s and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s electoral systems are the only ones which rated as good considering all their ethnic minorities and all three aspects. Both electoral systems are based on the idea of consequent proportional representation (almost without regional districts and without national thresholds); the electoral system which is applied in Kosovo further over-represents ethnic minorities in special districts, elected by PR. Mixed-ethnic parties are possible in both electoral systems, as there are no elements which would incite to vote for ethnic minority (or ethnic majority) parties (and thus negatively incite the vote for mixed-ethnic parties).

On the other side, the QCA test regarding the first aspect showed serious problems for ethnic minority representation in a number of legislations. Barriers to ethnic minority representation may be particularly problematic in countries where the ethnic cleavage is salient. A number of such countries have been identified in the analysis:

?? Albania and Bulgaria ban ethnic minorities by law from running their own parties.

?? Serbia and the Republic of Moldova introduced high national thresholds into their PR systems, which exclude ethnic minorities from representation. Particularly for the important Albanian, Bosniak, Roma and Hungarian communities in Serbia and the Gagauz.
community in Moldova this has drastic consequences. All those groups have a population share that is below the vote share necessary for electoral success. Consequently, they are excluded from parliament. PR with districts would allow most of those groups (except Serbian Romas) to get parliamentary representation, but would still avoid a too large fractionalisation of the political scene. Serbia changed its electoral system in order to give ethnic minority parties a chance in the forthcoming elections to parliament by not applying the national threshold to their parties.

However, those countries are not the only ones in the region. There are several other cases where even medium-sized ethnic minorities are excluded from running their own parties (cf. chapter 2); the here listed cases regard only those countries where ethnic cleavages are particularly salient.

Electoral systems are not an endogenous institution; they are created through the governing majority. Hence they may be a means to exclude ethnic minorities from public life. According to the results of this study, the impact for electoral rules depends heavily on the ethnic population structure and (especially when studying incentives for the election of mixed-ethnic parties) on the voters’ distribution. Consequently, when designing electoral systems, it may be crucial to consider how large ethnic minorities are and if they are geographically dispersed – or if in contrast they constitute local majorities. Without considering the single countries’ characteristics regarding its ethnic minorities and the salience of the ethnic cleavage, electoral rules are not transferable.

The author
Daniel Bochsler (*1978) writes his PhD thesis at the University of Geneva (Switzerland) on electoral systems and party systems in the new European democracies. In his master thesis in political science, he studied the effect of proportional electoral systems in multi-ethnic societies, comparing Switzerland and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the last years, he was carrying out research on federalism at the Swiss Graduate Institute for Public Administration (Idheap) and worked for the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

Bibliography
Appendix A

Testing the party representation model (1st aspect) with a binary logistic regression

Introduction

In the model that is presented in section 2, I test my 1st aspect for the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern European countries; thus, I test if my hypotheses on the possibility of party formation under certain electoral rules work.

The characteristics of my hypothesis (several conjunctional paths with binary variables and binary outcome) appear ideal to test them using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). That is what I have done in the main text.

From a methodological point of view, it is interesting to compare results that have been obtained using different methods. Using quantitative methods, binary logistic regressions are suited to investigate into problems with binary outcomes. Furthermore, interaction terms (technically: multiplication of independent variables) allow us to operationalise conjunctional paths. Those are solutions where a positive outcome may be expected only if several distinct characteristics are present.

Regression model tests

I tested my hypotheses and the same cases like in the QCA analysis with a binary logistic regression model. Overall, 106 cases (ethnic minorities) were included into the calculation. Dependent variable is the existence (or not) of their own party in parliament (which – as additional condition – competed with an own list in the elections).

Due to high multi-collinearity, the small number of cases and the different paths (several possibilities how a positive outcome can be reached), statistical significance may not be achieved; just as little as with QCA analyses. Instead, this analysis has the aim, to try to replicate a QCA analysis with a regression models. I include my conjunctional hypotheses that have been developed for the QCA analysis. All the independent variables are coded binary (0 or 1). The results are reported in table A1 (specifications 1-2; for a description of the independent variables, see main text).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Existence of an ethnic minority party 1 (N=106)</th>
<th>Existence of an ethnic minority party 2 (N=106)</th>
<th>Existence of an ethnic minority party 3 (N=26) Grouped cases</th>
<th>Existence of an ethnic minority party 4 (N=26) Grouped cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.06</td>
<td>-4.428</td>
<td>-1.099</td>
<td>-20.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAN</td>
<td>-18.143</td>
<td>-18.584</td>
<td>-20.104</td>
<td>-20.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL</td>
<td>24.169</td>
<td>25.033</td>
<td>21.955</td>
<td>40.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {2} * PR</td>
<td>3.397</td>
<td>4.362</td>
<td>21.877</td>
<td>40.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {1;2} * PR</td>
<td>2.087</td>
<td>39.288</td>
<td>20.843</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {1;2} * CONC * nat_const * PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {1;2} * CONC * PR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {1;2} * CONC * pr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1: Results of the binary logit regressions; included variables: conjunctional hypotheses.

The first specification explains the existence of ethnic minority parties only with two paths: Either, special constituencies exist (SPECIAL), or, ethnic minorities are large (SIZE {2}) and proportional representation is used as electoral systems. Both terms have a positive coefficient, which is larger than the constant term: In consequence: If at least one of those conditions applies, my model suggests that ethnic minority parties exist. As the variable BAN figures in all the paths, it is measured separately. The results show, that if ethnic minority parties are forbidden (BAN), the outcome is negative.24

24 Apart from cases where special constituencies exist – but cases with special constituencies and banned ethnic minority parties are theoretically not plausible and empirically inexistent.
The second specification includes all the four paths; in difference to the first specification I added two conjunctional paths. The explanatory force (Nagelkerke R²) is only slightly increased. The second path (SIZE {2} * PR) and the two additional paths (SIZE {1;2} * CONC * nat_const * PR + SIZE {1 ;2} * CONC * pr) are each not concluding: The coefficients are smaller than the constant. Hence, if the coefficient of one of those paths is added to the constant, the y-value is still negative, but close to 0. In a logit regression model, this means that the probability of a positive outcome is still below 50%. This may be explained with the contradictory cases in my database. The three paths do not lead necessarily to a positive outcome; not always ethnic minority parties exist. Again, the variables SPECIAL and BAN have large values; leading both to clear outcomes.

As a second step, according the logic of the QCA, cases with identical independent variables are arranged in groups. This results in 26 groups (cf. table 2 in the main text). Contradictory groups (all the independent variables are identical, but the outcomes different) were coded as positive. This is in line with my hypotheses: electoral success of an ethnic minority party is possible, but not all the ethnic minority groups with this configuration formed ethnic minority parties.

In the regression model on grouped cases (specifications 3-4), the direction of the coefficients remains the same. However, the values of the coefficients change. Most of the coefficients range about the same values; hence both (in specification 3) respectively three out of four paths (in specification 4) are almost equal – each of them leads to a positive outcome. Only one of the independent variable (SIZE {1;2} * CONC * pr), regarding mixed electoral systems with concentrated and middle-sized or large ethnic minorities, appears rather ambivalent.25 This is the consequence of the non-existence of Russian parties in Lithuania: in contrast with my hypotheses, the large Russian minority is not represented by an own party (see main text). This is why the regression model reports an unclear result for this group of cases.

Until this point, I tested with the regression analysis exactly the formulated hypotheses and could contest them to a wide degree, although without explaining the outcome of all the cases/case groups. In difference with the regression model, the QCA analysis does not only test the hypotheses, but provides as well the empirically “true” result. It shows the exact formula, which explain in which empirical cases outcomes are positive. This is what I want to replicate in the next step with the logistic regression. For that goal, I have to change the independent variables slightly. As independent variables, I include exactly the result I got with my QCA analysis (see main text). Results are reported in table A2, in specification 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Existence of an ethnic minority party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE {2} * PR</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ban * SIZE {1} * CONC * nat_const</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ban * SIZE {0;1} * pr</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2: Results of the binary logit regressions; included variables: QCA results.

Now, likewise with the QCA analysis, the independent variable perfectly predicts the dependent variable (possible existence of an ethnic minority party). The binary regression model does not any more estimate coefficients, because the model got deterministic.

Discussion
The problem, which I tested with this regression model, is based on hypotheses that are particularly suited for QCA analyses. I explained, which configurations of ethnic minority structure and electoral laws allow ethnic minority parties to exist. In this model, almost all the independent and the dependent variables (with

25 The sum of the coefficient and the constant, or, in other words, the z-value for cases where the condition is positive, is close to 0. Hence, for this path, the regression model does not predict if ethnic minority parties exist or not.
exception of the size of the ethnic minority population) are binaries. Furthermore, according to my hypotheses, there is not one only important variable, but four different highly conjunctional paths. The QCA analysis leads to an empirical result that is very close to my hypothesis – which has almost been confirmed.

In spite of the characteristics, which resemble very much a “school book example” that is suited for a QCA analysis, when following the logic of QCA and grouping identical cases into case groups and coding contradictory cases positively, I managed to replicate the analysis with a binary regression model (specification 5). Furthermore, the regression analysis allows me better to test the explanatory force of my original hypotheses (specification 3).

However, the regression analyses showed several limits of this application: First, it was not possible to calculate meaningful significance terms; the importance of the model may only be read through of the correctly coded cases (or the interpretation of the easier readable, but for binary logistic regressions not always very performing $R^2$). Second, it was not possible to include – as control variable – all the single terms of which my conjunctional terms (up to four variables included) consisted. Collinearity was too high. When we attend to apply binary regression analysis with highly conjunctional terms, binary independent variables and few cases, we may maybe control for very specific alternative hypotheses. However, in difference to OLS regressions and ratio scaled variables, a systematic test of all the partial terms of which the conjunctional terms consist, appears impossible.

What are the suggestions of this application for the comparison of regression methods and the QCA method?

- The QCA approach opens new perspectives for comparative research. Particularly the idea of arranging cases with same independent variables into case groups appears original and may be useful in particular cases. In the present study, this allowed to identify groups with contradictory outcomes: configurations, which evidently allow ethnic minority parties to exist, even if they are not always formed. For my research question, this procedure was an advantage, as it allowed me to code those cases positively. Furthermore, the deterministic perspective of the QCA approach may in specific cases be an advantage. QCA introduces the logic of multiple paths. And finally, Boolean algebra helps to find empirically existing conjunctional conditions, but it appears evident those have to be theoretically explained.

- In my example, I showed that some of those achievements (groups of identical cases; existence of several paths) may be borrowed from the QCA approach and applied in regression analyses.

- In kind of hypotheses testing however, the regression analyses offer the same possibilities like the QCA approach. In both approaches, it is possible to apply a hypothesis on empirical cases and search for outlying cases (even if not often practiced with regression analyses). But regression analyses – with their probabilistic approach go further than QCA and allow for probabilistic models and significance tests.

- Wider opportunities do not only regard the significance tests: The particular advantages of regression models are the possibility of including not only binary, but also ordinal or – most-of-all – ratio scaled dependent and independent variables. Further, regression analyses offer much more powerful opportunities for the testing of alternative hypotheses.

Overall, the QCA approach does not appear as unbeatable opponent of the regression analyses. Certainly, QCA teaches us original ways of how constructing research designs, and how to read and interpret results. The core of the method, the Boolean algebra, however, does not appear as more performing than other methods. On the contrary: the strengths of the QCA approach may be transferred to other analysis methods – which in return give a much wider analytical tool to the researcher (quantitative variables; significance tests; alternative hypotheses, etc.) than QCA does.
Appendix B

Description and discussion of the electoral laws of the Central and Eastern European countries (and sources for country information)

General sources
Alesina et al. (2003) and Gurr et al. (2005) for population data; Jovanovic (2004) and Shvetsova (1999) for information on electoral systems.

Albania
Electoral system: Mixed, compensatory electoral system with two ballots. Single member districts (71%) and compensatory PR seats (29%). Ban on ethnic minority parties, but it is not applied on one party of the Greek minority (which in fact is ethnically based, but not declared as).

Last elections in 2005. One ethnic minority party for the Greek minority (4% of population) elected (Unity for Human Rights Party), holding 1,4% of the seats in parliament.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Impossible, because of the ban on ethnic minority parties. In fact (but not by law) ethnic minority parties may be under-represented because of the single-member districts. Possibility of ethnic gerrymandering.
2. (Plurality): Difficult, because ethnic minorities would risk losing their representation if voting for several candidates.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): Incentives through the ban on ethnic minority parties. But ethnic minorities’ demands may be insufficiently considered.

Country-specific sources:
- Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe – Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), Minorities In Southeast Europe, Roma of Albania. Author: Maria Koinova; http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-albania-roma.doc
- Census: www.instat.gov.al (for information on the concentration of Greeks, Serbs and Macedonians).

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Electoral system: Proportional representation with large constituencies, no threshold, ethnic minority quota (in the attribution of seats to list candidates).

Last elections in 2002. Five parties, holding 29% of seats, represent the Serbian minority (31%); three parties (17% of seats) represent the Croat minority (17%).

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible. Ethnic minority representation guaranteed through quota; although not in form of ethnic minority parties.
2. (Plurality): Possible.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No incentives.

Country-specific sources:
- Central Electoral Commission (www.izbori.ba)
- Alesina et al. (2003) and Gurr (2005) for population data.
**Bulgaria**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with a 4% threshold. Ban on ethnic minority parties, which is not applied on the Turkish minority party.

Last elections in 2005. The party of the Bulgarian Turks (9.5% of the population) gets 14.2% of the mandates (DPS). Furthermore, a Macedonian party (VMRO) was elected on a joint electoral list.

Three aspects:
1. **(Representation):** Impossible, because of the ban on ethnic minority parties.
2. **(Plurality):** Impossible.
3. **(Mixed-ethnic parties):** Incentives for mixed-ethnic parties, as ethnic minority voters may not vote for “their” parties.

**Country-specific sources:**
- Shvetsova (1999), for the electoral system.
- ????????? ????????????? ????????? ; ??????????? 2001; ????????? ??? 01.03.2001 ?, ?? ??????? ? ?????????
- ?????; http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm, for census data

**Croatia**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 10 districts. Special constituencies for six national minorities; usually with one mandate, the largest minority (Serbs) holds three mandates which are accorded in two-ballot majoritarian elections. In some of those ethnic minority districts, several minority groups are united.

Last elections in 2003. Minority organisations of Serbs, Muslims, Hungarians and Germans* were elected. Italians* are represented by an independent candidate; Czechs* by a member of a mixed-ethnic party.

* (Three of the listed minority groups were not included in the analysis in the main text as they are not listed as minorities in the census data.)

Three aspects:
1. **(Representation):** Possible for minority groups that have special districts or that are able to attract a majority voters in a district of several ethnic minorities.
2. **(Plurality):** Impossible (or difficult) due to majoritarian vote in single-member or multi-member districts.
3. **(Mixed-ethnic parties):** Possible, if a majority of the ethnic minority voters opt for them. Otherwise difficult, as ethnic minority members may not vote in the general PR districts and hence do often not have (chanceful) candidates of mixed-ethnic parties to vote for.

**Country-specific sources:**
- Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske, Popis 2001, http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv/Popis%202001/Popis/H01_02_02/H01_02_02.html

**Czech Republic**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% national threshold (10% for coalitions).

Last elections in 2002. No ethnic minority parties elected.

Three aspects:
1. **(Representation):** Only possible for large ethnic minorities (Moravians).
2. **(Plurality):** Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:

**Estonia**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 11 districts. The national threshold (5% or 3 district mandates) applies only for remaining seats, which are accorded on the national level.

Last elections in 2003. No ethnic minority parties elected.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for concentrated or large minorities.
2. (Plurality): Possible.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives.

Country-specific sources:
- National Electoral Committee; http://www.vvk.ee.

**Hungary**

Electoral system: Mixed electoral system (compensatory) with 176 single-member districts, 20 multi-member constituencies (for 152 mandates), with proportional elections with a 5% (10-15% for coalitions) national threshold, and 58 compensatory mandates in a nationwide constituency. Double ballot.

Last elections in 2002. No ethnic minority party elected.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for very concentrated or large ethnic minorities. Risk of under-representation due to SMD elections and compensatory elements in the mixed electoral system.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:

**Kosovo**

Electoral system: Proportional representation. Ethnic minorities vote in special PR multi-member districts; altogether with 20 out of 120 seats.

Last elections in 2004. The Serbian and the Bosniak minority both elected each two ethnic minority parties; Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian voters (in a joint multi-member constituency) elected three parties, while Turks and Gorani are represented each by one ethnic minority party.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible. Over-representation.
2. (Plurality): Possible.

3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): Possible.

Province-specific sources:
- OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo Elections Operation 2004, Certified Final Election Results (Set Aside Seat Allocation).
  http://kosovoelections.org/Common/results/Certified%20Final%20Results%202004%20Set%20Aside%20Seat%20Allocation.pdf

**Latvia**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% national threshold.

Last elections in 2002. One party of the Russian minority (PCTVL -For Human Rights in a United Latvia) elected with 25% of seats.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for large ethnic minority groups.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:
- Peteris Zvidrins, Characteristics of the Minorities in the Baltic States, 2005,

**Lithuania**

Electoral system: Mixed electoral system without compensation; 71 of 141 mandates are allocated in single-member districts (first-past-the-post), 70 mandates by proportional representation in a countrywide constituency with a 5% threshold.

Last elections in 2004. One party of ethnic Poles (6.9% of population) was elected, holding 1.4% of mandates (Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action). There is no information about the ethnic group of five independent deputies in the Seimas. However, none of them has a slavonic name (all the investigated ethnic minorities in Lithuania are Slavonic) and 4 of them declared Lithuanian as their native tongue, while the fifth did not declare any language.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for very concentrated or large ethnic minorities. Risk of under-representation due to SMD elections and the mixed electoral system.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:
**Macedonia**

Electoral system: Proportional representation in six constituencies.

Last elections in 2002. Four Albanian parties (DUI; PDP; PDA; NDP) hold 21.7% of the seats; while the Albanians count 22.9% of the countries' population. A candidate of a Roma party (PPRM) was elected on the ballot of an electoral alliance headed by an ethnic Macedonian party (Friedman 2005: 388ff.).

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for concentrated or large ethnic groups.
2. (Plurality): Possible.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No incentives.

Country-specific sources:
- Friedman (2005) on the electoral success of ethnic minority parties.

**Montenegro**

Electoral system: Proportional representation in a countrywide district with a 5% threshold. The predominately Albanian municipality of Ulcinj votes in a 2-seat district according PR without threshold requirement.


Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Only for the Albanian minority (special district) and the Serbian minority possible (sufficient large to meet the threshold). Under-representation of the Albanian minority, because votes for Albanian parties outside the special electoral district of Ulcinj get wasted due to the 5% threshold.
2. (Plurality): Possible for the Serbian minority (being very large with 32% of population) and for Albanians, due to the multi-member district with PR rule.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No incentives.

Province-specific sources:
- OSCE 2002.

**Poland**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% national threshold (8% for coalitions), but ethnic minority parties are excluded from the threshold.

Last elections in 2005. One party (Mniejszosc Niemiecka) of the German minority (0.4% of the countries’ population) was elected with 0.4% of mandates in the Sejm.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible.
2. (Plurality): Possible.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No incentives.

Country-specific sources:
Romania
Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% national threshold (8% - 10% for coalitions). 18 special seats for ethnic minorities without threshold requirement; however, only one party per ethnic minority may get a special seat.

Last elections in 2004. The party of the Hungarian minority (8.5% of the population) gained 6.2% of the mandates (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania); 18 parties of different ethnic minorities were elected, holding each one mandate.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Guaranteed for 18 ethnic minority groups.
2. (Plurality): Difficult, as the special legislation concerns only the largest of each ethnic minority parties.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): Negative incentives, as the special seats are blocked for mono-ethnic parties.

Country-specific sources:

Russia
Electoral system: Mixed electoral system with 225 out of 450 mandates by proportional representation with a 5% threshold and restrictive rules for list registration; 225 mandates in single-member districts (first-past-the-post).

No electoral results considered, because independent deputies are not attributable to ethnic groups.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for large or very concentrated ethnic groups. Risk of under-representation due to SMD elections and the mixed electoral system.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:

Serbia
Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% threshold.

Last elections in 2003. Two parties of the Bosniak minority (Socijalno-liberalna stranka Sandžak; Bošnjacka demokratska stranka Sandžaka) were elected on the list an ethnic majority party.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible only for large ethnic groups.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Province-specific sources:
**Slovak Republic**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 5% threshold.

Last elections in 2002. A party of the Hungarian minority (10.6% of the population) was elected (Party of the Hungarian Coalition), holding 13.3% of the parliament mandates.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible only for large ethnic groups.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:
- Friedman (2005) on the electoral success of ethnic minority parties.

**Slovenia**

Electoral system: Proportional representation with 11 districts. The national threshold (4%) applies only for remaining seats, which are accorded on the national level. Two special constituencies for the Hungarian and the Italian minorities in single-member districts by preferential vote.

Last elections in 2004. Two candidates for the Hungarian and the Italian minorities were elected.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for concentrated or large minorities or those represented in the special constituencies.
2. (Plurality): Possible.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No incentives. (The preferential vote in the special constituencies does not support mixed-ethnic parties, as only ethnic minority voters vote in those constituencies.)

Country-specific sources:

**Ukraine**

Electoral system: Mixed electoral system with 225 out of 450 mandates by proportional representation with a 5% threshold and restrictive rules for list registration; 225 mandates in single-member districts (first-past-the-post).

No electoral results considered, because independent deputies are not attributable to ethnic groups.

Three aspects:
1. (Representation): Possible for large or very concentrated ethnic groups. Risk of under-representation due to SMD elections and the mixed electoral system.
2. (Plurality): Difficult.
3. (Mixed-ethnic parties): No particular incentives, but may profit from the difficulty to elect ethnic minority parties.

Country-specific sources:
### Abbreviations

- **QCA** Qualitative Comparative Analysis

### Electoral systems

- **AV** Alternative Vote
- **PR** Proportional representation
- **SMD** Single-member district systems
- **STV** Single Transferable Vote

### Ethnic groups (short form; country; group name)

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